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ABSTRACT
Little empirical research exists in the area of measuring 
morality and moral development of business, business people, and 
business-related professions such as accounting and law. While 
these professions have Codes of Professional Conduct that state that 
members must be of high moral character, mechanisms for empirically 
measuring moral character have, until recently, been non-existent. 
Through the pioneering research by Lawrence Kohlberg, a moral 
development testing instrument is now available.
The purpose of this study was to measure the level of moral 
development of auditors in three national ("Big-Eight") accounting 
firms, utilizing Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. 
Eighteen subjects were randomly selected from each of 3 "Big-Eight"
firms for a total sample of 54 subjects. Of these 54 subjects, 18
were partners of their respective firms and the remaining 36 were
entry-level staff accountants. This research was conducted in both
New York City and New Orleans, Louisiana; 27 subjects were inter­
viewed in each city (9 partners and 18 staff accountants).
Parametric and non-parametric statistics were used to 
measure the median level of moral development of accountants and to 
test for differences in the level of moral development between
(1) partners and staff accountants
(2) accountants in each of the two cities, and
(3) differences among the three firms.
vii
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The median score of the accountants surveyed was measured as 
Kohlberg's conventional stage 4(3) and a moral maturity score (MMS) 
of 373- At the .05 level of significance, no difference in moral 
development was detected:
(1) between partners and staff accountants
(2) between accountants in New York City and New Orleans, 
Louisiana, and
(3) among the three accounting firms surveyed.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND. RATIONALE FOR THE STUDY 
Introduction
The accounting profession, and auditors in particular, has 
been increasingly concerned with the question of ethical and moral 
integrity, both within the business firms they serve and within the 
profession itself.
At the national level, the accounting profession must 
operate under rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) designed to protect the public from incompetence or 
lack of integrity among accountants. The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountant's (AICPA) Code of Ethics articulates 
concepts of conduct to which each member is expected to adhere. 
This code is similar to the ethical codes of the medical and legal 
professions.
Emphasis on ethical and moral standards of public and 
private behavior was heightened in the 1970*s and early 1980's. 
Public disillusionment with events such as Watergate, President 
Nixon's retirement, and the United States involvement in Vietnam 
contributed substantially to the emphasis on ethical and moral 
standards. Additionally, the Brilab investigations have uncovered 
organized crime links with national and local politicians; the Texas
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Hunt brothers were accused of manipulating silver bullion prices in 
early 1980 when silver rose to over $50 an ounce, before falling 
back to $11 an ounce; certain political strategists contend that 
Senator Ted Kennedy lost the 1980 Democratic nomination because of 
his perceived lack of credibility and morality in the minds of 
voters regarding the Chappaquidick affair.
These observations indicate that concerns with moral and
ethical behavior and development in business and in the professions
are attracting more attention at the global, societal, and
individual levels. Moral development, as used herein, is defined as 
the growth, evolution, or advance from a lower to a higher stage of 
morality. Morality is the quality of conformity and rightness of 
actions and thoughts arising from a sense of duty and right conduct.
The concept of morality, moral values, and moral development 
is philosophically interconnected with ethics, ethical values, and 
ethical development in human society and its institutions, including 
education, as well as its intellectual disciplines including psy­
chology, sociology, and anthropology. Randall and Buchler [1971, p. 
257] compared ethics and moral values with the human sciences:
. . . Ethics, on the other hand, is concerned not with
the description and explanation but with the evaluation of 
human conduct. In the former sciences, (psychology, 
sociology, and anthropology) the concepts of "rightness" and 
"wrongness," "goodness" and "badness" do not occur, except 
as part of the actual judgments men are found passing, and 
they are not concerned with the conditions under which these 
concepts are correctly applied to conduct. We must not 
suppose, however, that ethics has no connection with psy­
chology, anthropology, and sociology. On the contrary, the 
judgments and distinctions of ethics can be made more 
accurate, precise, and sound the more they are based on the 
factual knowledge that may be furnished by these and other
sciences, and the more this knowledge g r o w s .............An
understanding of moral values relating to man must surely be 
increased if we know as much about man as we are able.
Since the time of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, concepts 
of morality and ethics have been a source of major philosophical 
debate. In Aristotle's book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, two 
requirements are stipulated for human conduct to be considered 
moral: (1) this conduct must be voluntary, and (2) human conduct
must affect the basic direction of human life for the better. The 
directions would include man's intentions and actions toward other 
individuals, society's institutions (religion, education, govern­
ment), or the formation of his own individual character. Aristotle 
also deals with the concept of human "happiness," but his is a sub­
stantially different concept than today's concept of happiness. 
Aristotle's "happiness" is a participation and a personal sharing of 
the intellectual wealth of the community— it can exist only in one's 
community, which denies happiness to the hermit. Aristotle's 
"happiness" is important because of his view that social institu­
tions (including business) and human interaction with these 
institutions are necessary for rationality. Aristotle would deny 
the concept many business people today hold, that of a "self-made" 
person.
Plato, on the other hand, asked what the appropriate role of 
each class in a society in equilibrium would be as his "good 
republic." To Plato, each class was analogous to an element of 
human mental operation; rulers and top government administrators are
analogous to reason in the human soul, the army and its soldiers 
analogous to will, and the business and labor community analogous to 
human appetite. To Plato, the appropriate function of the business 
community is to provide for the material needs of the government's 
citizens in an efficient manner. Essentially, each class had its 
function and, ethically, should discharge this responsibility 
efficiently. Hence, even the Greek philosophers were divided on the 
ideal direction of moral and ethical developments, although both 
espoused a cognitive developmental approach to reasoning [Beauchamp, 
1979].
This division leads to various ethical theories still 
debated today. These ethical theories may be divided into 4 major 
bodies of thought:
(1) Deontology - based on the ethical theory of duty
(2) Teleology - based on the ethical theory of utility
(3) Axiology - based on the ethical theory of values
(4) Egoism - based on the ethical theory of self-interest
Deontology
Deontology maintains that the concept of duty or obligation 
is independent of the concept of good. Essentially, a variety of 
relationships among people and between people and institutions have 
significance independent of the consequences of these relationships. 
For example, older customers of business enterprise may be 
favored over new or first-time customers in the purchase of scarce
goods, since the enterprise has an obligation or duty to sell to 
their existing customers first. Thus we have the concept of 
conscience, as articulated by Immanuel Kant, in his Foundations of 
the Metaphysics of Morals [Kant, 1973]. Kant's concept of con­
science, obligation, and duty may be viewed as an extensive 
reworking of the fundamental moral rules such as the Golden Rule.
Teleology
Teleological theories maintain that the moral worth or value 
of actions and practices is determined solely by the consequences of 
these actions and practices. Often referred to as utilitarianism, 
an action or practice is right (compared to any alternative) if it 
leads to the greatest possible balance of good consequences. Con­
cepts of duty and obligation (deontology) are subordinated to, or 
determined by, that which is good. David Hume and John Stuart Mill 
developed the first utilitarian philosophical writings in the 1700's 
and 1800's. Jeremy Bentham also influenced modern economics 
philosophically with his hedonic calculus that, to Bentham at least, 
quantified personal happiness. His utilitarian theory molded sub­
stantial economic theory— price and diminishing marginal utility are 
economic theories based on utilitarianism— and much business theory 
has been subsequently built on these theories.
Utilitarianism has been divided into hedonistic utilitarian­
ism (any action is right if it maximizes pleasure) and pluralistic 
utilitarianism (other values, such as friendship, knowledge, and
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courage, besides pleasure have intrinsic value). Another division 
is act versus rule utilitarianism. Act utilitarians argue that one 
should perform the act that provides the greatest good for the 
greatest number. Rule utilitarians argue that ethical actions and 
judgments should conform to publicly-advocated moral rules. Many 
philosophers believe that rule utilitarianism is more adequate as a 
moral theory than is act utilitarianism because rule utilitarianism 
is not subject to multiple courses of actions that can change fre­
quently. The accounting profession's Code of Ethics is an example 
of rule utilitarianism.
Axiology
Axiological theories deal with the nature, types, and 
criteria of values and value judgments. A particular value or value 
judgment is often viewed in substantially different ways by 
different people. An individual's "point of view" and life 
experiences determine his value system, and these differing value 
systems of individuals create two philosophical difficulties. 
First, communication between individuals is restricted due to their 
differing "points of view;" secondly, value systems are culturally 
influenced and therefore very difficult to agree upon. Plato’s Meno 
is an example of the philosophical difficulty Socrates and Meno had 
with the concept of virtue when different value systems existed 
between them. Even now, much as it was with Socrates and Meno, many 
modern communication difficulties exist due to differing "points of 
view."
Egoism
Egoism is divided into two categories— psychological egoism 
and ethical egoism. Psychological egoism is the motivational theory 
based on the concept that man is always motivated to act in his own 
perceived self-interest. Some people act in a manner that overlooks 
or denies their real self-interest, yet they perceive these acts as 
in their self-interest. An example would be observed in the 
behavior of a narcotic addict. Ethical egoism was proposed as the 
alternative to psychological egoism. Ethical egoism is the theory 
about what one ought to do. Ethical egoism contends that taking 
others' interests into account when it suits one's purpose promotes 
one's own self-interest, because others' well-being influences one's 
own well-being.
These concepts of egoism were considered by the economist
Adam Smith who recognized that this self-interest, guided by the 
"invisible hand" of government, could enhance the economic stem. 
Smith's concept of "restrained self-interest" within the established 
rules of the competitive business "game" has been accepted by many 
in the business community, although Smith's faith in the ultimate 
convergence of community interest and self interest might be 
regarded as overly optimistic today. [Grassian, 1981, p. 52].
As this brief review of the four major ethical theories
indicates, the concerns for ethical standards and ethical behavior 
have long existed. In recent years, concerns for ethical standards
and ethical behavior have been the subject of extensive debate
and reflection in the business community. Concern for morality and
ethics in business firms and in the behavior of their top operating 
officials has escalated with disclosures of illegal bribes paid 
abroad, leading to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The 
Metcalf Committee report has heightened awareness of moral and 
ethical responsibilities in the accounting profession and, in part, 
led to expanded reporting by business firms and their auditors.
This study is concerned with ethics and morality in the 
accounting profession. More specifically, this study is concerned 
with the development of ethics and morality, the progression from 
lower to higher levels of morality, and the way in which this 
development may be measured in individual accountants. To date, 
there has been no known reported research of moral development of 
auditors employed in public practice. It is proposed that ethical 
and moral development of auditors be empirically measured, using the 
cognitive-developmental approach initially suggested by Socrates 
and, more recently, by Lawrence Kohlberg and others.
Nature of the Problem
In recent years the accounting profession, along with the 
business community in general, has been subject to serious criticism 
regarding moral standards and ethical behavior. Blumenthal [1976] 
stated:
As a result of Watergate and other recent incidents in 
our society, a certain number of our institutions have come 
under scrutiny, if not under attack, far more than ever 
before. And this kind of public concern has created a 
skeptical and sometimes hostile atmosphere in which the 
business community must do its work [p. 32].
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Dunstan [1978, p. 75] observed: "'Ethics in business,1
'good business practice,' 'business responsibility' are the topics 
of today . . . men of business are concerned to be just, and to be 
seen as just." Dunstan calls for business and professional people 
to engage in moral reasoning to enhance leadership and serve the 
public interest. Dunstan states: "His task, in short, is to engage
in moral reasoning" [p. 76] so that "... moral leadership will be by 
persuasion, in relation to the moral principles or axioms believed
in, to the facts of the case and to the options actually available"
[p. 78, emphasis added].
The accounting profession has a code of ethics that 
addresses the nature of auditor ethics and service in the public 
interest:
-To coordinate, on a voluntary basis, the plans, pro­
grams, and activities of the state societies and of the 
institute, with particular emphasis on the adoption of
uniform codes of professional ethics and enforcement
-To cooperate fully with all organizations of account­
ants, both at home and abroad, to the end that the entire 
accounting function can make its maximum contribution to the 
public good.
-To encourage all CPA's to perform a wide range of 
services in the broad field of accounting consistent with 
their professional competence and their ethical responsibil­
ities . [emphasis supplied, AICPA, 1978, Rules of Conduct 
and Bylaws, p. 19-20]
Since the accounting profession is dependent on public 
trust, any criticisms that this public trust is violated is of 
serious concern to the profession. Recent legal disclosures and 
court cases involving corporate malfeasance, irresponsibility, and
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illegal actions gave impetus to criticisms of the auditor's role in 
corporate financial reporting.
Several court cases have resulted in criminal convictions of 
auditors. In the Continental Vending case (U.S. v. Simon, 1969), 13
CPAs were convicted of gross negligence. In the National Student
Marketing Corporation case (U.S. v. Natelli, 1975), another CPA was 
convicted of filing false and misleading information under the 1934 
Securities Act. In the Equity Funding case, which was a large- 
scale, computer-assisted management fraud, three CPAs were convicted 
along with others. In the Equity Funding case the court found that
if management fraud is so material as to make the financial state­
ments misleading, then the auditors must assume responsibility.
The financial problems of companies (such as Lockheed and 
Penn Central) that ultimately led to either bankruptcy or reorgani­
zation prompted a Congressional investigation of the accounting 
profession. This investigative report, The Accounting Establish­
ment , was chaired by Senator Metcalf (hereafter referred to as the 
Metcalf Committee Report-MCR) and was published in 1977.
The MCR was predominately an investigation of the practices
of the largest accounting f'rms in the United States. The "Big-
Eight" firms were criticized by the MCR:
Doubts as to the accuracy and reliability of information 
reported by corporations have resulted from continual rev­
elation of corporate misconduct which was not found or not 
reported by independent auditors .... Public confidence in 
the independent auditors, which is essential to the success 
of the Federal securities laws, has been seriously eroded 
[MCR, p. 7].
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In addition to the MCR, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
was passed in 1977 (hereafter referred to as FCPA). The FCPA was 
passed due to widespread bribery and other illegal acts committed by 
corporations. Auditors were criticized for failure to discover many 
of these illegal acts; the FCPA charged both management and auditors 
with the joint responsibility for detecting any such illegal acts.
The preceding examples suggest that the accounting pro­
fession is being scrutinized by the courts, the Congress, and by the 
public. This scrutiny, and the criticisms it engenders, relates to 
the moral and ethical development and behavior of accountants. The 
accountants Code of Ethics offers guidance as to the moral and 
ethical standards he or she should aspire to, but even with this 
Code of Ethics, there is no assurance that it is followed. These 
criticisms of the profession's ethics should encourage the pro­
fession to measure the moral development of its practitioners, which 
is the purpose of this study.
Purpose of this Study
The public accounting profession has been, and will continue 
to be, concerned with the public trust. Since the public trust is 
to be protected by the implied level of moral development of its 
practitioners, moral and ethical development has a significant 
influence on the development of GAAP in response to the several 
needs of readers and users of financial information, to wit:
1. Fairness, objectivity, and measurability of financial 
information
2. Disclosures related to "societal" and "environmental" 
needs of users
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3. Development of more efficient and effective communica­
tion vehicles in response to changing "societal" and 
"environmental" mores.
The need for ethical and moral standards in the public 
accounting profession is implicit; the concept of ethical and moral 
standards are explicitly stated in the Code of Ethics. Yet, in the 
area of behavioral research in business and accounting, no research 
has been directed to the measurement of moral development of 
individuals of a profession.
The purpose, then, of this study is to measure moral 
development of individuals in the accounting profession. The study 
of an individual's moral judgment will provide a numerical measure 
(index score) of moral development, which can then be used to 
determine a need for additional moral education in modern accounting 
education curricula and/or continuing education at the accounting 
firm level, or the need for more effective policing of the Code of 
Ethics by the AICPA.
Statement of the Study 
and Definition of Terminology
This study is designed to investigate the four following 
questions:
1. What level (stage) of moral development have the public
accountants in this study attained (or operate at)?
2. Does a difference in moral development exist between top
management (partners) of accounting firms and their
staff employees ("juniors")?
3. Does a difference in moral development exist between
different accounting firms?
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4. Does a difference in moral development exist between 
different cities (specifically, New York, New York 
versus New Orleans, Louisiana)?
These four research questions will be presented as formal 
research hypotheses in Chapter 3* A brief description of the 
definitions employed in this study is presented below; detailed 
definitions will be found in Chapter 3. The methodology employed in 
this study is presented in the following section.
For purposes of this study, "accountants" refers to 
individuals classified as either partners (equity owners) or staff 
accountants ("juniors") of a given firm. Staff accountants 
("juniors") are also defined as having no more than two years of 
experience in the profession at the time of selection for this 
study. •
The accounting firms that participated in this study are 
national ("Big Eight") firms. Their common characteristics include: 
a national, and international, scope of operations, they are very 
large in size, with hundreds of partners and thousands of pro­
fessional staff; each firm provides auditing, tax, and management 
advisory services; finally, client companies include substantially 
all major corporations in the U.S.
Methodology
The methodology of this study is based on independent 
samples randomly selected from three "Big-Eight" accounting firms. 
Both partners and "juniors" will be selected from each firm. Since 
each firm has offices in New York City and New Orleans, partners and 
juniors will be selected in each city.
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As explained in detail in Chapter 3, individual interviews
of subjects in this study were quite expensive. Each firm
donated the interview time of their partners and juniors (along with 
the inevitable clerical support required); the opportunity cost of 
this research to each firm was considerable. It was initially 
decided that approximately 40 interviews would allow the use of the 
more powerful non-parametric and parametric statistics.
Four "Big-Eight" firms were initially contacted; one firm 
declined to participate in this study, and three agreed to par­
ticipate. In consultation with the three firms that agreed to 
participate, it was determined that each firm would be agreeable to 
the expansion of this study to include sampling more "juniors." The 
rationale for this expansion was the significantly lower opportunity 
cost to each firm of sampling "juniors."
Consequently, a sample size of 54 respondents was employed.
The 54 respondents consisted of 36 juniors (12 per firm, 6 from each
city) and 18 partners (6 per firm, 3 from each city).
More than 54 respondents were randomly generated to provide 
for a "ready reserve" (approximately 30 to 50%) so this research 
could continue without interruptions due to any specific inter­
viewee's sickness, travel, or other incapacity. Therefore, 
approximately 20 juniors from each firm (10 per city) and 8 partners 
(4 per city) were randomly selected. The first 12 juniors per firm 
(6 per city) and the first 6 partners per firm (3 per city) were 
interviewed subject to any substitutions necessary. A complete 
analysis of this methodology is presented in Chapter 3.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
Introduction
Concern for the moral values of professional and business 
people has increased in recent years. In the accounting profession, 
this concern has been expressed by the profession itself, primarily 
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). 
Concerns regarding the "rightness," or morality, of business firms' 
actions and dealings with customers, government, and employees have 
been expressed, particularly by the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission (SEC).
In light of this concern with moral values and moral 
development, this review of related literature will consist of two 
major sections. The first section will review the related 
accounting and business literature, with particular emphasis on 
criticisms leveled at business firms and the accounting profession 
by the SEC and should serve to enhance an understanding of the 
issues involved in business and professional moral development.
The second section of this chapter focuses on a review of 
the related literature in the area of moral development. The cog­
nitive-developmental theories of moral development articulated by 
Lawrence Kohlberg will be emphasized. Since Kohlberg's theory has
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been empirically tested by many researchers, his moral development 
instrument will be employed in this study to measure the level of 
moral development of accountants in selected "Big-Eight" firms.
Review of Related Accounting Literature
There appears to be an emerging concern for an "ethical
position" and a "higher morality" among business and professional
leaders in today's society. As Dunstan [1978, p. 75] points out:
"Ethics in business," "good business practice," "business 
responsibilities," are the topics of today. Moral philoso­
phers and theologians find themselves invited to seminars, 
consultations, symposia— with business men, managers, 
directors, marketing men, teachers in business schools.
Codes of practice are evolved, circulated, revised. Busi­
ness is business still. But men of business are concerned 
to be just, and to be seen as just.
Dunstan calls for managers and business men to engage in 
moral reasoning to enhance corporate leadership. For the business 
man, "His task, in short, is to engage in moral reasoning" [p. 76] 
such that "Moral leadership will be by persuasion in relation to the 
moral principles or axioms believed in, to the facts of the case and 
to the options actually available" [p. 78].
W. M. Blumenthal [1976], President and Chief Executive
Officer of the Bendix Corporation, illustrates the grave questions
being raised currently regarding the moral standards and ethical
behavior in the business world.
As a result of Watergate and other recent incidents in our 
society, a certain number of our institutions have come
under scrutiny, if not under attack, far more than ever
before. And this kind of public concern has created a
skeptical and sometimes hostile atmosphere in which the
business community must do its work [p. 32].
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Blumenthal concludes:
But one thing is certain: There is a moral tone in much of
the criticisms which has been leveled against business in 
the past few years. The central issue is integrity--and 
much depends, in the coming years, on the forthrightness and 
courage with which we face up to that issue [p. 34].
Adair [1974], among others, argues that managers may seek 
profits and growth of their constituent firms as long as the 
individual manager has an obligatory personal moral philosophy to 
observe the dignity of his fellow man. Janzen and Boersma [1976] in 
their study also stress an individual's moral philosophy. They 
argue that what society needs is not more alert, skillful, achieve­
ment-oriented people, but rather more people who are capable of 
higher moral judgment.
Moral criticism has also risen in the accounting profession. 
Senator Lee Metcalf, in the 95th Congressional Senate report 
entitled The Accounting Establishment [1977] (hereafter referred to 
as the Metcalf Committee Report-MCR), sought to "inform Congress and 
the public regarding the participants involved in development and 
applying accounting practices which significantly affect government 
policy, the economy and society in general" [p. 1]. The MCR is
generally critical of the accounting profession, particularly in 
respect to the apparent dominance of the "Big Eight" and other large 
accounting firms who, according to the MCR, . . have prospered
from this Federal requirement [to audit and certify the financial 
statements of "publicly-owned corporations"] because they are 
retained as the auditors for the Nation's major corporations. Such 
auditors are responsible for providing independent certification
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that corporate financial statements present fairly and accurately 
the results of business activities" [p. 1.].
Additionally, the MCR is also critical of seeming impro­
prieties, bias, and mistakes made by many of these "Big Eight"
firms. The following three paragraphs illustrate the MCR position
regarding the role of auditors in administering the various Federal 
securities acts:
Independent auditors must have the complete confidence 
of the public for whose benefits the Federal securities laws 
were enacted. That confidence can only be maintained by 
strict adherence to standards of conduct which assure the 
public that auditors are truly independent and competent to 
perform their responsibilities. Even the appearance of bias 
or conflict of interest by an independent auditor can erode
the public confidence necessary to make the disclosure
policy embodied in the Federal securities laws successful.
The primary purpose of the Federal securities laws is to 
instill public confidence in the reliability and accuracy of 
information reported by publicly-owned corporations. Doubts 
as to the reliability and accuracy of such information
impair its usefulness to the public for making efficient 
economic and social decisions, and defeat the purpose of the 
securities laws. Independent auditors perform a key func­
tion in achieving the goal of the Federal securities laws 
because they provide the means for independently checking 
and confirming the information reported by corporations.
Historically, Congress and the public have regarded 
accounting as an arcane subject better left to accountants 
themselves. Continual relevations of wrongdoing by
publicly-owned corporations have caused a new awareness of 
the importance of accounting practices in permitting such 
abuses to occur. Unexpected failures of major corporations 
have led to requests for substantial assistance to such 
companies from taxpayers. Accounting practices ultimately 
involve social issues that affect the Nation's economic 
welfare [pp. 1-2].
The final paragraph of the MCR summary reaches a foreboding, 
and chilling, conclusion for the accounting profession:
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Because of their broad social and economic significance, 
accounting issues must be addressed by Congress and the 
public in a manner which ensures that the public interest is 
protected. If past abuses are to be prevented in the 
future, it is important that the accounting establishment, 
which has permitted many abuses to occur, be understood. 
Accounting issues are too important to be left to accountants 
alone [emphasis added; p. 2}.
A number of so-called "improprieties" and "judgmental 
errors" were reported in the MCR, of which several comments were 
directed precisely at the moral and ethical codes of participants 
and accountants. In the Report of the Trustee of Equity Funding 
Corporation of America (EFCA) October 31, 1974 [reprinted in the
MCR, pp. 704-725], Equity Funding's auditors came under very heavy 
criticism for not detecting the fraud perpetuated over many years. 
Rhetorically asking, "How did the fraud last so long?," the trustee 
asserted:
If the EFCA fraud was truly as haphazard and disconnec­
ted as it has been portrayed in this report, then it is 
legitimate to ask how it persisted for a decade without 
detection. Obviously a number of factors contributed to the 
longevity of the conspiracy. Foremost, of course, were the 
lies, audacity and luck of the ringleaders. Of almost equal 
importance was the surprising ability of the originators of 
the fraud to recruit new participants over the years. 
Closely related was the moral blindness of those partici­
pants, including several who helped execute the scheme and 
then left the Company, but remained silent. It is note­
worthy that in the end, the fraud was undone by the spite of 
a former conspirator who had been terminated, not by any­
one's conscience pangs [emphasis added; MCR, pp. 718-719].
The trustees went further: "Responsibility for failing to
detect the fraud rests primarily with the accounting firms retained 
to certify the financial condition of EFCA and its subsidiaries 
. . . . Aside from the perpetrators themselves, only the auditors, 
as part of their annual examinations, had regular opportunities to
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review these books and records" [MCR, p. 719]. The trustee con­
cludes: "In the Trustee's judgment, had the auditors properly
discharged their obligations, the fraud would have been caught years 
ago" [MCR, p. 719]-
The Equity Funding Corporation of America was not the only 
case examined by the MCR; other "Big Eight" accounting firms had 
similar cases reviewed, such as Whittaker Corporation [Accounting 
Series Release (ASR) No. 157, July, 1974] and National Student 
Marketing Corporation, Talley Industries, Inc., Penn Central 
Company, and Sterling Homex Corporation [ASR No. 173, July, 1975]. 
Both generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and generally 
accepted auditing standards (GAAS) were criticized by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in these ASRs, particularly the 
standards of field work, client representations, and client manage­
ment integrity. The accounting concept of "present fairly" lead to 
many of these cases.
Professor A. J. Briloff has widely criticized the accounting
profession's concepts of "present fairly" and GAAP [Briloff, 1976a].
Repeating two political scientists, Briloff quotes them as follows:
Skilled obfuscation is now an essential accounting tool . . . 
Accountants are described as "hired miracle workers," 
rewarded by a market for "financial alchemy," obsessed more 
with paper representations than with real things [p. 2].
He continues: "The condemnation, in words or pictures, puts
in question the viability of the accounting profession and the 
validity of its very special body of knowledge, namely, generally 
accepted accounting principles" [p. 2]. Critical of the Financial
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Accounting Standard Board (FASB) for its reliance of voluntary co­
operation to establish accounting standards, Briloff charges:
I have observed the ways in which it (FASB) has avoided 
the critical issues, vacillated on other controversial 
matters, and handed out special dispensations in order to 
obtain a concensus for a particular standard. I expected 
much, much more from a select body endowed with presumptive 
independence and supposedly possessed of intellectual might, 
integrity and intrepidity. In short, we have had a surfeit 
of compromise, of the vulgar pragmatism, of pussy-footing 
and inching along, if we are to overcome the prevailing 
crisis in confidence in corporate accountability Ip. 9].
Briloff concludes that not only have failures in GAAP been 
chronicled, but failures exist also in GAAS, causing, in his view, a 
proliferation of legal suits:
If auditors had, in fact, recognized the significance of 
the term standards in the phrase auditing standards there 
would never have been the proliferation of litigation 
against the leaders of our profession for their dismal per­
formance of the attest function.
Specifically, I maintain that the accounting profession 
itself is confused as to what it is saying, and the respons­
ibility it is assuming, when the accountants certify that 
the statements are supposed to be fair in accordance with 
GAAP. I am now zeroing in on the accountant's assertion of 
"fairness" [p. 28].
Briloff reviews the historical Seidman Committee report in 
1965 that focused on fairness in financial statement presentation, 
and he stated:
For a decade the accounting profession treated the 
Select Committee's urgent plea with benign neglect. In the 
meantime accountants were shaken by guilty verdicts against 
them in the Continental Vending and National Student Market­
ing fiascos; they were the subject of obloquy in the Penn 
Central and other civil actions— all revolving about the 
question as to whether it is sufficient for statements to be 
merely GAAP-fair or whether they must, in fact, be inherent­
ly fair as the independent auditor sees the fair [MCR, pp. 
1638-1639].
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A definitive codification of the "present fairly" doctrine 
was not promulgated until 1975, when the AICPA issued Statement on 
Auditing Standards (SAS), No. 5 [AICPA, 1975]. In paragraph 4 
(p. 2), the fifth point (e) reads: "the financial statements
reflect the underlying events and transactions in a manner that 
presents the financial position, results of operations, and changes 
in financial position stated within a range of acceptable limits, 
that is, limits that are reasonable and practicable to attain in 
financial statements." Critics charge that the "range on acceptable 
limits" may well be too large; the MCR and Briloff imply that 
substantial ethical and moral judgment will be required to discharge 
the accountant's professional obligations codified by SAS No. 5. 
Not only does the MCR call for substantial changes, but Briloff also 
has called the major changes, such as a "Corporate Accountability 
Corporation" [p. 5], and a restructuring of the current AICPA dis­
ciplinary apparatus so that " . . .  the oligopolistic stranglehold by 
the Big Eight firms over the American Institute of CPAs must be 
broken in the profession's disciplinary and self-regulatory pro­
ceedings" [p. 45]. Also on p. 34, Briloff states some independent 
board should be formed to advance the accountant's personal 
principles:
I maintain that all of the arguments advanced by the Wheat 
Committee report leading to the establishment of an 
independent, broadly constituted board for the advancement 
of principles of accounting are appropriate with even 
greater import for the advancement of the principles of the 
accountant [p. 45].
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Briloff had five recommendations in his statement to the 
House subcommittee [pp. 46-50]:
(1) That the . . SEC use its disciplinary procedures 
more aggressively, more even-handedly, and more openly."
(2) That the . . SEC use its legislated authority to 
establish and implement standards of accounting and for 
accountants."
(3) That the ". . . SEC mandate that the independent 
auditor's certificate be interpreted to mean that the auditor, on 
the basis of his professional responsibility and capability, asserts 
that the statements are as fair as he sees the fair and that in his 
view the alternatives selected from the spectrum of GAAP are those 
which (again, in his judgment) are most conducive to the fair."
(4) Because the Supreme Court's Hochfelder decision 
(decided March 30, 1976, wherein a defendent, under Rule 10(b)-5 of 
the Securities Act of 1934, must be guilty of "intentional mis­
conduct" to be held liable for damages to third parties) narrowly 
and restrictively interprets Rule 10(b), according to Briloff; he 
believes it ". . . essential for the Congress to act promptly to
make clear . . ." that both the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934
entail a high degree of responsibility by all professions that bear 
on the issuance or trading of securities.
(5) Lastly, he proposes ". . . the establishment by
Congress of a Corporate Accountability Commission." This over­
arching body (subsuming the SEC, Internal Revenue Service, Federal 
Trade Commission, General Accounting Office and others) is seen by
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him to be a response to the limitations inherent in any one agency 
such as the SEC. He states: "Even the seemingly ubiquitous SEC
finds itself stymied when it is confronted with an inherently moral 
and behavioral question regarding corporate slush funds. . ."
[p. 50].
These comments and conclusions by Briloff appear to sub­
stantially influence the MCR. In addition to incorporating 
extensive excerpts from his books More Debits than Credits [Briloff, 
1976b] and Unaccountable Accounting [Briloff, 1972], the MCR also 
included several articles about, and interviews with, Briloff (see 
Barron's, April 12, 19, and 26, 1976). Also included is a letter 
from Briloff to Representative Charles A. Vanik, Chairman of Com­
mittee on Oversight of the Committee on Ways and Means [Briloff, 
1976c] wherein he states: "No, U.S. Steel, et.al., are not doing
anything illegal— it's just immoral" [emphasis added; p. 3].
Most importantly, however, is the incorporation of four of 
Briloff's five recommendations (in his 1976 Statement to the House 
of Representatives, reviewed earlier) in the recommendations reached 
by the MCR. Although the MCR presented sixteen recommendations, 
several MCR recommendations can be subsumed under one of Briloff's 
recommendations. The following exhibit illustrates these 
similarities:
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COMPARISON OF BRILOFF'S 1976 




A. SEC disciplinary proceedings
B. SEC to establish and implement standards
of accounting and for accountants
C. SEC to interpret "fairness" standards
D. Amend securities laws in wake of Supreme










E. Establish a "Corporate Accountability 
Commission"
Sources: Briloff [1976a, pp. 46-50]
MCR [1977, p. 20-24]
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The impact of the MCR on the accounting profession has been 
considerable and has caused the accounting profession's leadership 
to evaluate both accounting principles and auditing standards in 
light of potential direct governmental control. During the Metcalf 
Committee hearings in April, May, and June, 1977, Senator Metcalf 
publicly stated he and his staff " . . .  have not proposed additional 
legislation to achieve accounting reform . . .  I sincerely hope that 
we can achieve our objectives without new legislation" [Metcalf, 
1977, p. 7]. During these hearings, the then current President of 
the AICPA, M. N. Chetkovich, noted recent action by the profession 
to mitigate certain MCR criticisms, including the increasing 
existence of company audit committees, mandatory continuing pro­
fessional education in many states, and public disclosure of any 
auditor/management dispute on accounting matters that leads to a 
change in auditors.
The statements of Chetkovich and other leaders and scholars 
in the accounting profession during these hearings led to the final 
report of the Metcalf Committee on November 4, 1977. This Senate 
report, entitled "Improving the Accountability of Publicly-Owned 
Corporations and Their Auditors" [Report of the Subcommittee on 
Reports, Accounting and Management of the Committee on Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate, 1977], stated in the Introduction, "Public 
confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the business community 
must be restored because such confidence is the key element in 
making the Nation's economic system function effectively [p. 1].
This report modified the MCR recommendations as presented in March;
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the purpose of the subcommittee's investigation was . . to
improve the accountability of publicly owned corporations by 
improving the performance and stature of accounting firms which 
provide services to such corporations" [p. 2]. .The subcommittee 
acknowledged " . . .  that this subcommittee's inquiry was useful as a 
catalyst to help achieve necessary reforms" [p. 3].
The subcommittee recognized that critics of direct govern­
mental standard setting . . endorsed efforts being made within
the private sector to improve the performance of independent 
auditors" [p. 3]. Consequently, the subcommittee stated: "Self­
initiated action by the private sector in cooperation with the SEC 
is the method of reform preferred by subcommittee members" [p. 4] 
since " . . .  the subcommittee's staff study, several witnesses, and 
the SEC itself clearly demonstrated that ample authority already 
exists within the present framework to meet the goals which are con­
tained in this report" [p. 4]. That standard setting was to remain 
in the private sector is a major modification of the MCR, as well as 
no call for immediate Congressional action. However, the sub­
committee made it quite clear that new legislation may be required 
if the profession moves too slowly: . . the amount of time for
achieving reforms is not unlimited. Therefore, the subcommittee 
expects the accounting profession and the SEC to act in a timely 
manner to implement the policy goals in this report" [p. 22].
A number of these subcommittee goals have been reached; the 
AICPAs Division of Firms was presented to the membership on August 
8, 1977 [ The CPA Letter, Special Supplement, August, 1977]. The
28
AICPA Council approved the division of firms into the "SEC Practice 
Section" and the "Private Companies Practice Section" on September 
17, 1977 [ The CPA Letter, September 26, 1977, p. 2], along with a 
Public Oversight Board to monitor the SEC Practice Section and 
mandatory peer reviews for SEC Practice Section (SECPS) firms. 
Further, the SECPS rules provide for mandatory rotation of audit 
engagement partners and public reporting of certain firm informa­
tion. The Private Companies Practice Section (PCPS) affords smaller 
firms the opportunity for increased input into the AICPA as well as 
enhancing the status, and thereby enhancing the employability, of 
smaller firms. This PCPS should ultimately increase competition for 
audit engagements.
The AICPA Council also approved during the September meeting 
the following elements designed to counter criticisms of the SEC and 
MCR, and to attain several of the "policy goals" of the Senate's 
Subcommittee Report "Improving the Accountability of Publicly Owned 
Corporations and Their Auditors."
1. Opening to the public the AICPA Council meetings and
portions of the meeting of senior technical committees.
2. Addition of public representatives on the AICPA Board of 
Directors.
3. Public disclosure of disciplinary proceedings and names 
of members found guilty.
4. Modification of rules regarding advertising and repeal 
of the existing rules forbidding the contact of other accountants' 
staff with employment offers. [The CPA Letter, September 26, p. 2].
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Since the MCR's examination of the accounting profession, 
significant developments within the structure of the AICPA and 
increased SEC intervention in accounting principles and auditing 
standards are beginning to surface. Apparently, Congress and the 
SEC will continue with a "hands-off" policy as long as the pro­
fession counters public criticism vigorously by responsible actions 
and standards setting.
The Moss Committee, chaired by Representative John E. Moss, 
introduced in June, 1978, comprehensive legislation regulating the 
accounting profession via a "National Organization of SEC 
Accountancy (NOSECA)," similar to Briloffs "Corporate Accounta­
bility Commission (CAC)." Requiring mandatory registration by firms 
with one or more SEC clients and a 5-man Board (3 public members and
2 CPAs), the bill failed, in part due to the lack of support by the
SEC. The questions and proposals raised by Briloff and Moss have 
been raised by others: Burton [1978], a former SEC Commissioner,
has argued for a self-regulatory body (similar to the National 
Association of Securities Dealers) he would call the "National 
Association of Registered Accounting Firms (NARAF)" [pp. 67-68]. 
His premise, for NARAF is based on his belief ". . . because it
offers a promise of institutional stability that does not exist in 
the institutions currently in place" [p. 69]. He concludes:
If the approach is to be successful, the organization
that would be established to perform the self-regulatory
functions is of paramount importance. It must be highly 
professional, offer a rewarding and remunerative career path 
for staff and draw extensively on the participation of 
members. The member role must be real and effective. If 
such an organization can be established, the partnership
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provided by a formal self-regulatory mechanism is one that 
would offer substantial benefits. It is an institutional 
structure that should be seriously considered for the pro­
fession in the decade ahead, [p. 69].
Opposed to Burton's arguments is A. A. Sommer, Jr. [Sommer, 
1978], another former SEC Commissioner. Observing that Burton's
proposal calling for establishing the NARAF is markedly similar to 
Representative Moss' NOSECA (and to Briloff's CAC), Sommer concludes 
that the AICPAs division of firms accomplishes the same objectives 
as do the Moss and Burton proposals, with a possible exception that 
Burton might argue for overruling the Hochfelder v. Ernst and Ernst 
decision. Arguing against the increased governmental regulation 
implicit in the Moss and Burton proposals, Sommer concludes:
Perhaps the ultimate fault of Dr. Burton's proposals is 
that it is obsolete in terms of the current morals and 
beliefs of Americans today . . . the principal course of
[the problem of over-regulation] was the impatience of 
Americans for instant solutions to only discerned problems.
We had developed an excessive faith in the ability of law, 
and legislatures, and legislators, to guide us . . . Only
lately . . . are we beginning to bridle this impatience.
This is the consequence of our awakening to the realization 
that regulation is costly, often ineffective, often over­
kill, often stifling and often the enemy of imagination and 
resourcefulness [emphasis added; p. 75].
Carmichael [1979] also considers the regulatory mechanisms 
of the AICPAs division of firms and the FASB standard setting obliga­
tions preferable to increased governmental regulation. He contends 
that the expansion of the duties of the FASB to the broader concerns 
of financial reporting (beyond merely the accounting standards for 
financial statements) will provide benefits in the reduction of 
disclosure requirements (and hence expense) for smaller and closely- 
held companies and the ability to make financial reporting more
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meaningful to investors by "experimenting” with "soft" information
(for example, forecasting and inflation accounting).
In addition to the changes mandated by the MCR and SEC ASRs,
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) [FCPA, 1977]
requires certain accounting and internal control systems with which
publicly-owned companies must comply as SEC registrants. The
accounting standards set forth in the FCPA were taken directly from
the AICPAs Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS) N o . 1 (AICPA,
1973), section 320.28, and provides that:
"(A) make and keep books, records, and accounting, 
which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect 
the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the 
issuer; and
"(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting 
controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that-- i
"(i) transactions are executed in accordance with 
management’s general or specific authorization;
"(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to 
permit preparation of financial statements in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) 
to maintain accountability for assets;
"(iii) access to assets is permitted only in 
accordance with management's general or specific 
authorization; and
11 (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is 
compared with the existing assets at reasonable inter­
vals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any 
differences [FCPA, p. 1494].
Cook and Kelly [1978] indicate the SEC will likely pursue a 
"flexible" working definition of "devising and implementing" the 
internal accounting controls required by the FCPA:
. the Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs [Senate Report No. 94-1031, 1976] 
has made it clear that cost/benefit considerations and pro­
fessional audit judgment are essential to an evaluation of
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internal accounting control. This would not seem to 
indicate a need for inflexible regulatory requirements 
[emphasis added; p. 63].
With fines of up to one million dollars for firms violating 
this law (and up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment up to five years for 
individual officers, directors, or stockholders who violate this 
law), the FCPA required company managements to share in the respons­
ibility, along with the accounting firm, for adherence to GAAP (with 
respect to implementing a sound system of internal accounting 
control). It also forces these managements to assume responsibility 
for illegal acts committed by corporate officers and employees of 
both SEC and non-SEC reporting companies.
Subsequently, a number of United States corporations have 
voluntarily disclosed illegal or "questionable” practices. Sommer 
"1980] states:
As a consequence of the SEC investigations and the 
voluntary disclosure program, over five hundred U.S. cor­
porations have disclosed practices that, in one degree or 
another, reflected illegal or "questionable" or "improper" 
conduct at home or abroad . . . [and] virtually every case
of illegal or improper payments was accomplished by some 
falsification of, or improper entries on, the books of the 
corporation. In some cases, elaborate procedures were 
established to create "slush funds" offshore; in other 
cases, outright false entries disguised the uses to which 
funds were ultimately put [p. 55].
Sumutka's [Sumutka, 1980] study of disclosures of illegal or 
questionable payments of 117 corporations indicated a majority (93 
of 117) of the questionable payments involved "grease" or "facili­
tating" payments. These payments were made to obtain: services the
companies were entitled to, governmental approvals, permits, or 
clearances, and to collect accounts receivable or expedite product
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registration [p. 51]. The recipients of these questionable or
illegal payments were associated with governments (48%), non-govern­
mental customer or employee (22%) and third-party intermediaries 
(30%; the ultimate recipient could not be discerned) [p. 52],
Sumutka also noted that four methods were used in these payments or 
practices:
(1) Cash payments by fictitious or inflated invoices, pay­
ments of unwarranted commissions, employee reimburse­
ments, cashiers check or bank transfer, or payment of 
travel and entertainment expenses of recipient
(2) Transfers of merchandise
(3) Granting of price reductions by excessive discounts
(4) Use of questionable or illegal business methods 
(p. 54].
Sumutka also found that 50 of 117 companies had "off-book"
cash accounts; the sources of this cash were scrap sales, cash
sales, and vending machine receipts [p. 56]. Consequently, the
concern of auditors with improper or illegal actions of clients, as 
well as concern for potential fraudulent acts, is increasing. This 
concern prompted the Peat, Harwich, Mitchell Foundation to fund a 
major multidisciplinary study of fraud and fraud detection (Romney, 
Albrecht, Cherrington, 1980]. Their fraud model deals with three 
major human variables: (1) situational pressures, (2) opportunities
for the individual to commit fraud, and (3) personal characteristics 
{p. 64]. They point out:
A person with a high level of personal integrity and 
limited opportunity or pressure to commit fraud will most 
likely behave honestly. But fraud becomes increasingly 
likely as individuals with less personal integrity are 
placed in situations where there are increasing pressures
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and greater opportunities to commit fraud. An interesting 
philosophical question is whether the composition of a 
person's personal characteristics which make up the trait of
honesty can ever be so high that he is beyond the point of
being overcome by overwhelming situational pressures and 
convenient opportunities and temptations to commit fraud [p.
64].
The conclusions of Romney, et.al. are strikingly similar to 
the pioneering studies in honesty and moral behavior of Harshorne 
and May [1930] and Havinghurst and Taba [1949]. Romney, et.al. do 
provide a "Fraud-Risk-Evaluation" questionnaire for use by auditors 
to investigate the personality and demographic characteristics of 
top management and key employees [p. 65-68]; this questionnaire 
could be of major assistance in fostering management's compliance 
with the FCPA.
Burton [1980] questions not only the controversy surrounding 
the appearance of auditor independence (and suggests that MAS pro­
vide substantial knowledge of a client's operation, required to
effectively audit the client) but also the effect of audits on the
detection of fraud. On page 52 he states:
The audit. In order to justify a criterion based on the 
views of an informed citizen, it is essential that more 
persons be educated to understand what an audit is. Many 
outside the profession, particularly attorneys who are often 
the most active critics of the current auditing system, 
misperceive it as an adversarial or prosecutorial investiga­
tion, based on a search for error. While audits can help 
prevent fraud or errors, this results more often from the 
auditor's presence rather than from specific discoveries.
The audit process is designed to bring material fraud and 
error to light, but it is far from perfect. The auditor 
does not start with the assumption that management is 
covering up the facts. Professional skepticism does not 
imply a philosophy of distrust. When an auditor ceases to 
trust a client, it is fundamental that he should withdraw 
from an engagement.
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Burton notes that the audit is a cooperative venture between 
management and the auditor for the benefit of the users of the 
resultant financial statements. Given Burton's position as a former 
SEC Commissioner, it is worthy of note that he has also considered 
the possibility of alternatives to the "cooperative audit." He 
suggests that it may be appropriate for the auditor to ". . . become 
an investigator [note the similarity to Romney, et.al.], starting 
with the assumption that his responsibility is to find errors rather 
than to participate in a cooperative process designed to report in 
the most meaningful fashion" [p. 53].
Another approach would be to give the auditor primary 
responsibility for financial statements. The independent 
accountant could have the responsibility of satisfying him­
self as to the adequacy of the client's information system 
and then report from the data produced in the fashion he 
found most appropriate to describe the company's economic 
activities. In other words, the auditor's role could become 
that of the professional reporter digging after the facts 
and presenting them in the fashion he thought best [p. 
53-54).
Although Burton finds significant drawbacks to these alter­
natives (particularly regarding questions of who would pay auditors' 
fees, less work satisfaction for the auditor, and reduced auditor- 
management communication), his statements indicate an increasing 
need for audits that both fairly present the financial activity of 
the firm, as well as exhibit the potential to disclose fraud. 
Rappaport [1980] suggests a "strategic" audit to submit to the Board 
and its audit committee. Designed to assist the Board to discharge 
its fiduciary obligations to the company's stockholders, the 
strategic audit is defined ". . . as an overall' evaluation of
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factors that materially affect a company's economic welfare” 
[p. 73].
From the inception of the Metcalf investigations through the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the SEC's various ASRs, to current 
corporate disclosures of illegal and improper activities, the 
accounting profession finds itself under intense public scrutiny of 
its public role. Many critics of the profession may agree with the 
statement "the once feared watchdog (the SEC) is now management's 
poodle" [Sale, 1981, p. 83].
Summary of Related Accounting Research
Several criticisms emerge from this review of accounting 
literature; first, generally accepted accounting principles allow 
management significant flexibility in reporting operations and 
financial position that potentially may mislead readers of the 
financial statements. Secondly, generally accepted auditing 
standards and accounting principles are less than perfect for com­
municating financial information to users. Finally, moral and 
ethical values are not clearly and explicitly stated. As Barzun 
[1978] states:
A code [of professional ethics] only sets the limits beyond 
which behavior will be condemned, and the moral level is not 
high when all or most of those who live under it always act 
within a hairline of those limits. Codes, in fact, are for 
criminals and competitors, not for professions that want to 
be known as dedicated . . . [p. 68].
As a responsible, and responsive, profession-, it is incum­
bent upon the accounting profession to determine its level of 
morality. If this determined level of morality is acceptable, then
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the need for SEC "watchdog" activities is not necessary to serve the 
public interest. Conversely, if the determined level of morality is 
less than what is considered appropriate, the profession can take 
the action necessary to further develop morality. Since no known 
research has measured morality, or moral development, of account­
ants , this study should serve as an initial reference point for such 
research.
Review of Related Moral 
Development Literature
Lawrence Kohlberg of Harvard University has done significant 
research in the area of moral development and judgment in the last 
two decades. Yet, little research has emerged that directly 
measures the moral development of professionals and businessmen. . 
The purpose of this study is to employ Kohlberg's methodology to 
specifically measure the moral development of auditors in the 
accounting profession.
The following review of related moral development literature 
will include a summary of Piaget's pioneering work in developing 
stage-structure concepts and Kohlberg's adaptation of Piaget's stage 
structure to measure moral development. Further, the research of 
Kohlberg and others will be reviewed. Finally, corollary research 
findings stemming from Kohlberg*s findings will be presented.
Piaget's Cognitive Stage Structure
Kohlberg's theory of moral development is a cognitive- 
developmental model based on the developmental theories beginning
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with Dewey and developed more recently by Jean Piaget. Piaget was a 
French biologist who turned to child psychology after observing that 
children who wrongly answered standardized I.Q. tests did so with 
surprising consistency. These "wrong" answers that were so similar 
among same-age-level children gave Piaget his first clue to the 
patterns of thought and reasoning children use. From this 
beginning, Piaget conceptualized the cognitive-development theory of 
children's reasoning processes and, as a biologist, he considered a 
human being to exhibit two biological "invarient functions" of 
organization and adaptation. The human mind also exhibits these two 
"invarient functions" through assimilation (dealing with environ­
mental stimuli in terms of its current organization) and accommoda­
tion (a modification of its current organization in response to 
environmental stimuli). This "feedback loop," or systems approach 
to developmental learning, is the fundamental characteristic of 
Piaget's cognitive theory, which led to his "stages of development" 
[Hersh, et.al., 1979a, pp. 18-25].
Piaget's 4 stages of cognitive development were classified 
in an increasing order of complexity and intellectual integration; 
he classified these stages into their corresponding approximate age 
periods:
1. sensorimotor (birth to two years)
2. preoperational (two to seven years)
3. concrete operations (seven to eleven years)
4. formal operations (eleven years and older)
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The "sensorimotor" stage is limited to sense (sight, hear­
ing, taste) and motor or bodily movement in infants. As early as 18 
to 20 months of age, an infant starts to "remember" and develop 
"associations" in a limited sense. This introduces stage two (the 
"preoperational" stage) thinking, characterized as the egocentrism 
of young children. This stage incorporates the use of language, but 
the child has not developed an awareness that other people have dif­
ferent perspectives, nor can the child readily separate fact from 
fantasy; fantasy or the "unreal" is real to a child in this stage. 
The child cannot think logically, since the child cannot "get out of 
himself" to verify his position. Consequently, Piaget also charac­
terizes the "preoperational" stage as a "prelogical" stage.
The third stage ("concrete operations") represents the 
beginning of logical thinking by a child; the child starts to employ 
the intellectualization of "perspective," and overcomes fantasy with 
facts regarding what is real. Piaget uses the term "concrete opera­
tional" since this stage represents "operations" (e.g., addition and 
subtraction) that are reversible. A child knows that he may add two 
cookies to his plate by taking two from his younger brother's plate 
(or alternately, by taking one cookie from both his brother and his 
sister's plate); he "reverses" this action by subtracting two 
cookies from his plate and returning them to his brother (usually 
with some prodding from family members!). This stage also refers to 
"concrete" objects (how much does it cost, how tall is the ceiling) 
and is often seen as children's insistence on equality of size, 
rather than abstractions. The child's complaint "Mommy, Sue got a
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bigger piece of cake (or more ice cream) than I did" has been heard 
often, and typifies this stage.
Piaget's fourth stage of "formal operations" marks the 
ability of a child to reason by way of formal abstractions, or 
"operations on operations." Since it is apparent that marked dif­
ferences exist in the levels of abstractions reached by young 
teenagers, older teenagers, and adults, Colby and Kohlberg [1980] 
have suggested that "formal operations" be divided into two sub­
stages they delineate as "beginning formal operations" and "basic 
formal operations." In both substages, formal operations is the 
ability to think abstractly and to classify objects, concepts, and 
ideals by logically formal criteria. Much of Piaget's work in 
researching the development of formal operations is based on 
mathematical and scientific thinking (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958] due 
to his belief that these two areas present abstract logical rela­
tionships in the most unambiguous form.
To explain the stage development of cognitive activity, 
Piaget uses the term decalage, which implies the "spreading" or 
extension of "concrete" and "formal operations" thinking in a few 
areas to many areas as a child grows. In the western cultures, the 
second substage of "basic (or consolidated) formal operations" 
begins developing in mid-to-late adolescence. However, not all 
adolescents or adults reach this stage; Kuhn's recent large-scale 
study of adolescents and adults in California indicated that 
approximately one-half the subjects had reached the second substage 
("basic formal operations") of Piaget's stage four [Kuhn, 1977].
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Piaget also researched moral judgments of children to deter­
mine how children develop respect for societal rules and authority
[Piaget, 1965 and 1932]. He determined that the concept of "rules"
(authority-induced) was first understood at approximately age six; 
the rules for a six-year old were fixed, inflexible, and immutable. 
In the child's cognition, the rules must be followed "or else!" At 
age eleven, a new understanding emerges, one that acknowledges rules 
emanate from agreements of individuals in society. This new under­
standing is typically understood by the eleven-year-old in a game 
(baseball, football, marbles) context (rather than the more 
sophisticated and cognitively-developed context of society). The
child understands that the game rules can be changed to accommodate 
changing conditions if his peer group accepts and agrees to the new 
rules.
The move from the first to the second stage is not a purely 
cognitive process. Children do not simply think up a new 
definition of rules and respect. Rather, the cognitive
redefinition (the new understanding or consciousness) 
emerges as children work out a new set of social relation­
ships. As they become peers— one of several players on a 
team or members of a class— they slowly develop moral 
concepts to guide their behavior. In this process respect 
for rules becomes more adaptive. Children's behavior 
becomes more rationally guided by rules as they better 
understand the social contexts in which rules operate 
[emphasis added; Hersch, et.al., 1979b, p. 42].
While Piaget initiated research into children's moral 
judgment, he did not extend his studies to children past the age of 
twelve, nor did he detail the stages of moral judgment. This 
research into moral judgment stages was followed by Lawrence
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Kohlberg, who developed a parallel stage structure of moral 
development.
Kohlberg's Moral Development Stage Structure
Kohlberg maintains that six levels or stages of moral 
development exist on a continuum from the lowest level (stage one) 
through the highest level (stage six). The six stages are defined 
as follows [Kohlberg, 1977a, p. 189-190]:
KOHLBERG'S DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES
I. PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules 
and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets 
these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonis­
tic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of 
favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who 
enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into 
the following two stages:
Stage 1: The punishment-and obedience orientation. The
physical consequences of action determine its goodness or 
badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these 
consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning 
deference to power are valued in their own right, not in 
terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by 
punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which instrumentally satisfies 
one's own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human 
relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. 
Elements of fairness, or reciprocity, and of equal sharing 
are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, 
pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my 
back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or 
justice.
II. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the 
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and 
obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of 
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of 
loyalty to it, of activity maintaining, supporting, and 
justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or 
group involved in it. At this level, there are the follow­
ing two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or “good boy—
nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases 
or helps others and is approved by them. There is much 
conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or 
"natural*1 behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by 
intention— "he means well" becomes important for the first 
time. One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order1* orientation. There is
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the main­
tenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of 
doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and main­
taining the given social order for its own sake.
III. POSTCONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral 
values and principles that have validity and application 
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding 
these principles and apart from the individual's own identi­
fication with these groups. This level also has two stages:
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation,
generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to 
be defined in terms of general individual rights and 
standards which have been critically examined and agreed 
upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of 
the relativism of personal values and opinions and a cor­
responding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching 
consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and 
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of 
personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis 
upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon 
the possibility of changing law in terras of rational con­
siderations of social utility (rather than freezing it in 
terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, 
free agreement and contract is the binding element of obli­
gation. This is the "official" morality of the American 
government and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord 
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical
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comprehensiveness, universality, and consistenty. These 
principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the 
categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules 
like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal 
principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of 
human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings 
as individual persons.
In Kohlberg*s paradigm, this stage structure is both uni­
versal and invariant, and that a later (i.e. higher) stage resolves 
moral questions more satisfactorily than does an earlier stage 
[Kohlberg, 1971b]. The interactional (as opposed to cultural learn­
ing or biological-maturational) assumptions of Piagetian structural 
stage theory include the following [Kohlberg, 1977b, pp. 188-189].
1. Stages are defined as differences in form or organi­
zation of response, not in the content or function of the 
response. Each ... stage involves a new set of interests 
and concerns and defines a new function, e.g. finding an 
identity. Each cognitive or moral stage serves the same 
function, logical inference or moral judgment, but serves it 
in a new way, form or pattern of functioning.
2. Differences in form are qualitative, not quantita­
tive.
3. In a certain sense, then, stages are "cognitive," not 
in the sense of being free of emotions, but in the sense 
that a structure, or form of organization of personality is 
always a form of organizing thinking. Emotions develop as 
well as thoughts, but new emotions always have a base in 
thought and perception. In morality, one cannot develop 
from fear of punishment to guilt without developing the 
cognitive capacity to make moral self-judgments (as opposed 
to simply anticipating-punishing events).
4. Stages, as cognitive, are largely defined by com­
petence, not by performance. A capacity for judging in 
terms or moral principles is not always translated into 
morally principled behavior. Morally principled behavior, 
however, presupposes the competence to make principled moral 
judgment.
Kohlberg's stage-Btructure theory is illustrated in Table 1; 
the content of each level and stage (both "what is right" and
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"reason for doing right") as well as the social perspective of each 
stage is presented [Kohlberg, 1976].
The social perspective of stage structure development is 
summarized below "Hersh, et.al., 1979c]:
Stage 1-Punishment and Obedience Orientation 
The expressed wishes or orders of the authority figure 
become rules that a child understands he must follow to avoid 
punishment. Punishment is central to this stage conception; the 
child does not yet understand that punishment is only one possible 
response to his wrongdoing. Essentially, the child cannot disobey, 
since the following punishment will be too great to bear. A very 
primitive stage, this punishment/obedience orientation does not 
usually continue past preadolescence; stage two development usually 
starts at ages eight to nine.
Stage 2-Instrumental-Kelativist Orientation 
The child is able to take the role of one other person at a 
time and see the world from the other person's perspective (role- 
taking). The standard of fairness or equity emerges, wherein the 
actions of a person are judged based on "a good reason for doing
__________ rather than the "arbitrary" will of an authority figure.
This "fairness" means people of equal status or role should get 
equal shares (of ice cream, love, "staying-up-late" privileges, 
etc.). This sense of fairness means, in stage two, each individual 
can and should pursue his own best interests as long as it does not 
directly hurt anyone else. At this stage, hurt or harm is concrete 
reference; hurting oneself, such as cheating on an examination, does
Table 1
THE SIX STAGES OF HORAL JUDGMENT
Content of Stage
  Social Perspective




Sticking to rules backed 
by punishaent; obedience 
for its own sake; avoiding 
physical daaage to persons 
and propety.
Avoidance of punishaent, 
superior power of 
authorities.
Egocentric point of view. 
Doesn't consider the in­
terests of others or 
recognize that they differ 
froa the actor's; doesn't 
relate two points of view. 
Actions considered physi­
cally rather than in teras 
of psychological interests 






Following rules only when 
in one's iaaediate in­
terest; acting to aeet 
one's own interests and 
needs and letting others 
do the saae. Right is 
also what is fair or 
what is an equal exchange, 
deal, agreement.
To serve one's own needs 
or interests in a world 
where one has to recog­
nize that other people 
also have interests.
Concrete individualistic 
perspective. Aware that 
everybody has interests 
to pursue and that these 
can conflict; right is 





of StageLevel and Stage What Is Right Reasons for Doing Right
Level 11: Conventional Living up to what is The need to be a good Perspective of the indivi­
Stage 3: Mutual Inter­
personal expectations, 
■ Relationships, and 
Interpersonal con­
formity
expected by people 
close to you or what 
people generally ex­
pect of a good son, 
brother, friend, etc. 
"Being good" is impor­
tant and means having 
good motives, showing 
concern for others.
It also means keep­
ing mutual relation­
ships such as trust, 
loyalty, respect, and 
gratitude.
person in your own eyes 
and those of others; 
caring for others; be­
lief in the Golden Rule; 
desire to maintain rules 
and authority that sup­
port stereotypical good 
behavior.
dual in relationships with 
other individuals. Aware 
of shared feelings, agree- 
nents, and expectations 
which take primacy over 
individual interests. Re­
lates points of view 
through the concrete Golden 
Rule, putting oneself in 
the other guy's shoes.




Fulfilling duties to 
which you have agreed; 
laws to be upheld ex­
cept in ext reme cases 
where they conflict 
with other fixed 
social duties. Right 
is also contributing 
to the society, group 
or institution.
To keep the institution 
going as a whole and 
avoid a breakdown in the 
system "if everyone did 
it"; imperative of con­
science to meet one's 
defined obligations. 
(Easily confused with 
stage 3 belief in rules 
and authority.)
Differentiates societal 
point of view from inter­
personal agreement or mo­
tives. Takes the point 
of view of the system that 
defines roles and ruleB; 
considers individual rela­





Level and Stage What Is Right Reasons for Doing Right of Stage
Level III: Postconven-
tional; or Principled 
Stage 5: Social con­
tract or utility and 
individual rights
Being aware that people 
hold a variety of values 
and opinions and that most 
of their values and rules 
are relative to their 
group. Relative rules 
usually upheld in the 
interest of impartiality 
and because they are the 
social contract. Some 
non-relative values and 
rights (e.g., lifei and 
liberty) wist be upheld 
in any society and re­
gardless of majority 
opinion.
A sense of obligation to 
law because of one's 
social contract to stake 
and abide by laws for 
the welfare of all and 
for the protection of 
all people's rights. A 
feeling of contractual 
commitment, freely en­
tered upon, to faaily, 
friendship, trust, and 
work obligations. Con­
cern that laws and duties 
be based on rational cal- 
calculation of overall util­
ity, "the greatest good 
for the greatest nuaber."
Prior-to-society perspective. 
Rational individual aware of 
values and rights prior to 
social attachaents and con­
tracts. Integrates perspec­
tives by fonsal aechanisas 
of agreement, contract, ob­
jective impartiality, and 
due process. Considers 
moral and legal points of 
view; recognizes that they 
sometimes conflict and finds 





of StageLevel and Stage What Is Right Reasons for Doing Right
Level III: Postconven- Following self-chosen The belief as a rational Perspective of a aural point
tional; or Principled ethical principles. person in the validity of view from which social
(continued) Particular laws or of universal moral prin­ arrangements derive. Per­
social agreements 
usually valid because 
they rest on such 
principles; when laws 
violate these princi­




ciples of justice; 
equality of human 
rights and respect 
for the dignity of 
human beings as 
individuals.
ciples and a sense of 
personal coaitement to 
them.
spective is that of a 
rational individual recog­
nizing the nature of moral­
ity or the fact that per­
sons are ends in themselves 
and must be treated as such.
Source: Lawrence Kohlberg, "Moral Stages and Horalization: The Cognitive-Developmenta1 Approach," in Moral Develop­
ment and Behavior: Theory. Research and Social Issues, ed, Thomas Lickona (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1976), pp. 34-35.
50
not "hurt" someone else, and helps the cheater. At this stage, 
children cannot be convinced that cheating is morally wrong.
Stage 3- Interpersonal Concordance (Social Acceptability)
Orientation
Beginning at age 12 to 13, the child’s interests shift from 
the concrete interests of each individual to the interests of one's 
group (or society). Essentially, this stage is one of stepping out­
side a two-person relationship and seeing it from a third (or
outside) party viewpoint. How one should behave becomes important. 
At stage two, one looks out for one's self without harming another; 
at stage three, the relationship has expanded to a mutual trust or 
mutual commitment position. Breaking of that commitment with 
another is to a stage three person as acting unfairly is to a stage 
two person. This stage is the dominant stage for adolescents, and, 
along with stage four, is a major stage for most adults in Western 
society.
Stage 4-Law-and-0rder Orientation
The shift in stage three to stage four is fundamentally one 
of scope. The stage three individual utilizes a third-person per­
spective based on significant others, while stage four individuals 
use a generalized or collective third-person perspective. The 
interests of the individual or group are weighed against the welfare 
and interests of the whole; these individuals appreciate that a 
society is bound together by certain social and moral conventions 
(usually codified into law) and that actions that break these con­
ventions or agreements affect the degree of unity of that social
51
system. In stage four, the social system (or "society") preferred 
by an individual is a matter of content; a Communist and a Western 
capitalist may view the respective values of life and obedience to 
law quite differently; at stage four, the structured reasoning is 
the same for both (both Communist and capitalist view a social issue 
from the same fixed systems of laws and beliefs). This stage four 
reasoning starts developing in mid-to-late-adolescence; highly 
equilibrated, it is most often the highest level individuals in 
Western cultures attain. However, Kohlberg contends that stage 
four, even though highly equilibrated, is not adequate for resolving 
the conflicts between a system of laws and basic human rights. If 
the social system is unjust, people are forced to choose between 
adherence and dissent. Stage four reasoning does not provide per­
suasive criteria for when to choose dissent over adherence, or when 
faced with diversity outside the individual's own system, since a 
stage four person conceives of morality as a fixed system of laws 
and therefore cannot grant much, if any, validity to other views 
without threatening their own.
Stage 5-Social-Contract, Legalistic Orientation
Kohlberg*s research indicates that later adolescents may 
adopt a "relativistic" perspective, where all values are equally 
arbitrary, and the best one can do is to do what one thinks is 
right, without hurting or harming others and allowing them to do as 
they see fit [Kohlberg, 1973a]. His findings indicated that this 
adolescent "relativism" is an inherently unstable position. Upon 
entering positions of social responsibility, they either "shelve"
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relativism and utilize stage four reasoning, or seek a philoso­
phically more sound rationale for moral decision-making. Stage five 
is a direct outgrowth of relativism by recognizing that values are 
relative to one's group, but it goes further to seek principles to 
accommodate the differences in values. Kohlberg uses the concept of 
"social contract” to provide this accommodation. Both legal and 
social contracts represent the willingness of both parties to com­
promise in a cooperative agreement mutually binding on each party. 
Kohlberg denies, as a valid or morally binding principle, any 
contract that abrogates basic human rights of life or liberty, such 
as selling a child into slavery. Kohlberg expressed dissatisfaction 
with stage five as the ultimate stage [Kohlberg, 1973b] even though 
few Americans ever stabilized at stage five (and none of more 
primitive cultures).
Stage 6-Universal-Ethical-Principle Orientation
Influenced by John Rawls' "original position" [Rawls, 1971], 
Kohlberg identified his stage six as incorporating the philosophical 
concepts of "reversibility" and "universalizability." These phi­
losophical concepts have their origin, not in Plato or Aristotle, 
but the concept of "natural equality" of Man. Hobbes' "social 
contract" was based on the premise that men were "equal" in right 
due to roughly comparable strength and cunning; with a dismal view 
befitting the 17th century, Hobbes considered that men could agree 
("contract" for) peace in lieu of war, since the individual reasons 
that the probability of gain (or domination) is less than the
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probability of loss (death) [Erdynast, 1974, pp. 14-15.] This
"social contract" was also a tenant of John Locke:
Man being . . .  by nature all free, equal, and independent, 
one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the 
political power of another without his own consent, which is 
done by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a 
community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceful living, 
one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their pro­
perties, and a greater security against any that are not of 
it [Locke, 1961, p. 504].
The concept of the universality of social contract came from 
Immanuel Kant. To Kant, the moral element of the social contract 
came, not from the other party to the contract, but rather as a 
commitment by the original person. Consequently, each person must 
legislate his own personal moral standards and, since moral 
principles should be followed by all men in moral situations, these 
principles should be "universal" or have applicability to all 
people. Kant codified his universality maxim by stating his 
"categorical imperative" as this: "I ought never to act except in
such a way that I can alBO will that my maxim should become a 
universal law" [Kant, 1961a, p. 196].
Kant also stated his maxim another way: "Act in such a way
that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the 
person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same 
time as an end" [Kant, 1961b, p. 208].
Kant conceives of reversibility in much the same manner; 
from Kant to Rawls, the concepts of universality and reversibility 
have been the predicates of Kohlberg*s stage six. Kohlberg states 
[Kohlberg, 1973b, pp. 641-645]:
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Since Kant, formalists have argued that rational moral 
judgments must be reversible, consistent, and uni- 
versalizable, and that this implies the prescriptivity of 
such judgments. We claim that only the substantive moral 
judgments made at stage 6 fully meet these conditions, and 
that each higher stage meets these conditions better than 
each lower stage. In fully meeting these conditions, stage 
6 moral structures are ultimately equilibrated . . . .  
Universalizability and consistency are fully attained by the 
reversibility of prescriptions of actions. Reversibility of 
moral judgment is what is ultimately meant by the criterion 
of the fairness of a moral decision. Procedurally, fairness 
as impartiality means reversibility in the sense of a 
decision on which all interested parties could agree insofar 
as they can consider their own claims impartially, as the 
just decider would. If we have a reversible solution, we 
have one that could be reached as right starting from any­
one's perspective in the situation, given each person's 
intent to put himself in the shoes of the other . . . .
At stage 6, reversibility is attained by a second-order 
conception of Golden Rule role-taking. In the Heinz 
dilemma, Heinz must imagine whether the druggist could put 
himself in the wife's position and still maintain his claim 
and whether the wife could put herself in the druggist's 
position and still maintain her claim. Intuitively we feel 
the wife could, the druggist could not. As a result, it is 
fair for the husband to act on the basis of the wife's 
claim. We call the process by which a reversible moral 
decision is reached, "ideal role-taking." Stage 6 moral 
judgment is based on role-taking the claim of each actor 
under the assumption that all other actors’ claims are 
governed by the Golden Rule and accommodated accordingly.
This is what is meant by calling stage 6 reversibility the 
second-order application of the Golden Rule. The steps for 
an actor involved in making such a decision based on ideal 
role-taking are:
1. To imagine onself in each person's position in that 
situation (including the self) and to consider all 
the claims he could make (or which the self could 
make in his position).
2. Then to imagine that the individual does not know 
which person he is in the situation and to ask 
whether he would still uphold that claim.
3. Then to act in accordance with these reversible 
claims in the situation.
Kohlberg's original research in the 1950's dealt with a 
longitudinal study of American males. The stage of moral judgment
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displayed by a subject was determined by the subject's response to 




3. Personal Affectional Roles and Relations
4. Authority and Civic Order Rules
5. Civil Rights
6. Contract, Promise, Trust and Reciprocal Exchange
7. Punishment
8. Life
9. Property Rights and Rules
10. Truth
11. Sexual Roles
12. Value and Sexual Love
[Kohlberg, 1972b]
Using the Life issue (8 above), Kohlberg illustrates the 
movement to higher stages of reasoning exhibited by two boys of his 
longitudinal study as these boys matured [Kohlberg and Turiel, 
1971a, pp. 434-436]. These two boys were presented the following 
dilemma:
A rare drug which was U6ed in an attempt to save the wife of 
a man named Heinz didn't work, and there was no other treat­
ment known to medicine which could save Heinz's wife, so the 
doctor knew that she bad only about six months to live. She 
was in terrible pain, but she was so weak that a good dose 
of painkiller like ether or morphine would make her die 
sooner. She was delirious and almost crazy with pain, and 
in her calm periods, she would ask the doctor to give her
enough ether to kill her. She said she couldn't stand the
pain and that she was going to die in a few months anyway.
Should the doctor do what she asks and give her the drug
that will make her die? Why?
When Tommy was age ten he was asked: "Is it better to save
the life of one important person or a lot of unimportant people?" 
He answered:
All the people that aren't important because one man has 
just one house, maybe a lot of furniture, but a whole bunch
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of people have an awful lot of furniture and some of these 
poor people might have a lot of money and it doesn't look 
it.
Tommy measures the value of life in terms of the value of a
quantity of furniture. His thinking is typical of what Kohlberg
calls Stage 1, whereby an individual confuses the value of life with
the value of material objects or power. At the age of thirteen
Tommy said the following about mercy killing:
But the husband wouldn't want his wife to die, its not like 
an animal. If a pet dies you can get along without it— it 
is 't something you really need. Well you can get a new 
wife, but it's not really the same.
At this time Tommy is able to distinguish between the value 
of human life and property. Life, at Stage 2, is valued in terms of
the needs and wants of other individuals. The value of the woman's
life is defined in terms of its instrumental value to her husband, 
who can't replace her as easily as he can a pet.
Tommy gave the following answer at age sixteen:
It might be best for her, but her husband— it's a human 
life— not like an animal; it just doesn't have the same 
relationship that a human being does to a family, you can
become attached to a dog, but nothing like a human.
Tommy has moved to Stage 3 where life is valued in terms of 
human empathy and love for members of one's family. There is still 
an absence, at this stage, of any universal human value to the
woman's life so that there would be a similar regard for it even if
her husband didn't love her or if she had no husband.
Richard, another subject in Kohlberg's study displays 
thinking at higher stages. At age sixteen he said the following:
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It's not a right or privilege of men to decide who shall 
live and who should die. God put life into everybody on 
earth and you're taking away something from that person that 
came directly from God . . . it's almost destroying part of 
God when you kill a person.
Life, at Stage 4, is seen as sacred in terms of its place in 
a categorical moral or religious order. Life's value is not 
completely universal since it is dependent upon respect for God's 
authority. At this stage, moral value is defined by a conventional 
order that is maintained by fixed rules, law and authority.
Later at Stage 5 Richard gives the following response:
It's her own choice. I think there are certain rights and 
privileges that go along with being a human being. I am a 
human being and have certain desires for life and I think 
everybody else does too. You have a world of which you are 
the center, and everybody else does too and in that sense 
we're all equal.
At this stage, life is defined in terms of equal and
universal human rights in a context of relativity and also in terms
of concern for utility or welfare consequences. At age twenty-four,
Richard's thinking was at Stage 6, when he said:
A human life takes precedence over any other moral or legal 
value, whoever it is. A human life has inherent value 
whether or not it is valued by a particular individual. The 
worth of the individual human being is central where the 
principles of justice and love are normative for all human 
relationships.
At Stage 6, life is conceptualized as absolute, representing 
universal and equal respect for the human being as an individual. 
Life is centrally valued for itself rather than derived from, or 
dependent upon, social or divine authority.
t
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Research Employing Kohlberg's Stage Structure
Other researchers have investigated the two major tenents of 
Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning: first, that stage sequencing
is endogenous to his cognitive-developmental theory, and secondly, 
that his theory is universalizable across cultural boundries. 
Investigators of age as a determinant of stage sequencing have 
employed both longitudinal (particularly Kohlberg and his 
associates) and cross-sectional data. Eisenberg-Berg [1976] 
investigated moral judgment of white middle-class seventh to twelfth 
grade students, and found that older students exhibited sig­
nificantly higher moral reasoning as well as more liberal and 
humanistic attitudes. Saltzstein and Osgood [1975] also interviewed 
students in grades 1, 3, 5, and 8 and found the level of moral 
judgment positively correlated with age. They also noted that stage 
scores did not positively correlate with I.Q., lending support to 
the cognitive-development theory of Kohlberg.
Clinchy [1977] also noted the correlation between age and 
stage; females from traditional and progressive high schools were 
interviewed, and seniors' moral reasoning was significantly higher 
than sophmores. Further, the progressive high-school students 
exhibited higher stage reasoning than did students from traditional 
high schools. Turiel [1976] investigated 3 high school types; 
progressive, traditional, and parochial. Again, moral judgment 
levels increased with increasing age; he also found that students 
from progressive schools exhibited a higher level of moral reasoning
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than did those students in traditional schools, who, in turn, had 
higher levels than those from parochial school.
Longitudinal studies have been conducted by Holstein, Rest, 
and Kohlberg and his associates. Holstein [1976] conducted a 3-year 
longitudinal study to examine empirically Kohlberg's invariant stage 
sequencing among 53 upper middle class Americans. This study 
supports Kohlberg*s thesis for the first 2 of his 3 levels (i.e. 
stages 1 through 4); the third level (stages 5 and 6) were not 
attained by the subjects in Holstein's study.
Rest, Davidson, and Robbins [1979] examined several thousand 
high-school, college, and graduate school students, both cross- 
sectionally and longitudinally, using Rest's Defining Issues Test, 
adapted from Kohlberg*s Moral Judgment questionnaires. Rest found 
significant differences in moral judgment when subjects were 
classified by age-educational level. Adults exhibit significantly 
stronger positive correlation between moral judgment and years of 
education than between moral judgment and chronological age. The 2 
and 4-year longitudinal intervals indicate decreases in lower-stage, 
and increases in higher-stage, judgment. Rest suggests that a 
general developmental plateau occurs in each adulthood and after 
formal education is completed. Rest's study strongly supports 
Kohlberg's theory of moral development as a cognitive-developmental 
model, and suggests that advances in moral development can result 
from additional educational exposure.
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Colby et al [1979a] also asserts that intellectual develop­
ment precedes moral development, and that an individual's education 
will place a ceiling on the moral stage one can attain:
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced 
moral reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning. A 
person's logical stage has been found to put a ceiling on 
the moral stage she/he can attain . . . .  Moral reasoning at 
stages 4 and 5 requires consolidated formal operations (con­
sidering all possibilities, isolating variables, etc.). 
Logical development, then, is necessary for moral develop­
ment and sets limits to it, but it is not sufficient. Most 
individuals are higher in logical stage than they are in 
moral stage.
In short, logical or intellectual development precedes 
moral development. Moral development depends upon intellec­
tual development, but intellectual development does not 
depend on moral development [Colby et al 1979a, p. 13].
Colby, Kohlberg, and Gibbs [1979b] publicly presented the 
most recent findings of Kohlberg's 20-year longitudinal study of 58 
American males. Each subject was 10, 13, or 16 years old at time 
period one (1955), and was administered Kohlberg's interview at 
least twice; over 81% of them were interviewed 4 or more times 
during this 20-year period (see Table 2 for additional details). 
Kohlberg's 20-year data indicated 2 major findings; first, that the 
terminal ages of his subjects varied from 30 to 36 years old, well 
past the general completion age of formal education, and secondly, 
that all subjects exhibited higher stage reasoning at the conclusion 
of this study than exhibited initially in 1955. This progression to 
higher stage judgment exists even for the three subjects interviewed 
only 2 times [2 in time periods 1 (1955) and 2 (1959) and 1 in time 
periods 1 and 5 (1971)].
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Table 2
ANALYSIS OF KOHLBERG*S LONGITUDINAL DATA 
OF 58 AMERICAN MALES
A. NUMBER OF TIMES EACH SUBJECT WAS INTERVIEWED DURING THE TIME 
PERIOD 1955 TO 1976.







B. COMPARISON OF INITIAL (1955) AND ENDING (1976) GLOBAL STAGE
SCORES FOR KOHLBERG'S 58 SUBJECTS.
INITIAL* NUMBER ENDING* NUMBER
STAGE SCORE OF SUBJECTS STAGE SCORE OF SUBJECTS
2 (1) 13 2 (3) 3
2 13 3 (2) 1
2 (3) 9 3 7
3 (2) 8 3 (4) 12
3 12 4 (3) 10
3 (4) _3 4 17
4 (5) 4
5 (4) 4
N = 58 58
Source: Colby, Kohlberg and Gibbs [1979c].
*See page 62 for an explanation of Kohlberg's stage scores.
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The global stage scores in Table 2 are ranked from the
lowest stages (1 and 2, the preconventional level) to the highest 
stages (5 and 6, the postconventional or principled level) of moral 
judgment. Stage 3 is a pure stage 3 with less than 25% of a sub­
ject's reasoning at stages other than stage 3. If a subject
exhibits mixed stage reasoning (more than 25% of his or her
reasoning is at 2 or more adjacent stages), then the stage score is 
noted as 3 (4), which is predominately stage 3, but with 25% or more 
stage 4 reasoning exhibited, or 4 (3) which is predominately stage 
4, but with 25% or more stage 3 reasoning exhibited (a more detailed 
examination of Kohlberg*s scoring methodology will be presented in 
Chapter IV). The stage movement exhibited by Kohlberg1s subjects 
ranged from 1 full stage or less (24 subjects or 41%); more than 1 
full stage, but less than 2 stages (25 subjects or 43%); and those 
that moved more than 2 full stages (9 subjects or 16%).
The reader can see_, from Table 2 that few of Kohlberg's
subjects exhibit principled reasoning (stage 5 and 6). Only 4 of 58
subjects were scored as predominately stage 5; however, these 7% are
not pure stage 5 subjects, but rather exhibit significant (more than 
25%) stage 4 (conventional) reasoning. Further, another 7% (4 of 58 
subjects) were scored as stage 4 (5); at best, fewer than 14% of 
Kohlberg's subjects indicate any postconventional or principled
thinking, and no evidence of stage 6 is found in Kohlberg's longi­
tudinal study.
Consequently, while the cross-sectional studies (Eisenberg- 
Berg, Saltzstein and Osgood, Clinchy, and others cited earlier) and
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the longitudinal studies (Holstein, Rest et al, and Kohlberg, cited 
above) empirically support Kohlberg*s theory of stage-sequencing and 
development, little empirical evidence exists currently that clearly 
demonstrates Kohlberg*s principled reasoning (stages 5 and 6).
Kohlberg*s second major tenet is that his theory is uni-
versalizable across cultural boundaries:
The concept of stage implies an invariance of sequence in 
development, a regularity of stepwise progression regardless 
of cultural teaching or circumstance. Cultural teaching and 
experience can speed up or slow down development, but it 
cannot change its order or sequence [Kohlberg and Gilligan,
1971, p. 1058].
Kohlberg*s cross-cultural studies began with United States, 
Taiwanese, and Mexican urban males [Kohlberg, 1969a]. Subjects in 
all 3 societies demonstrated increasing use of higher stage (stages 
3 and 4) reasoning and decreasing uses of stages 1 and 2. The only 
significant difference between subjects were that United States 
subjects demonstrated more stage 4 reasoning than did the Taiwanese 
or Mexican subjects, leading to the conclusion that development in 
less-developed countries is slower than in the Western cultures. 
However, since stage 3 and 4 reasoning is exhibited in all 3 
cultures, higher stage reasoning is not unique to a purely American 
context. Kohlberg and Turiel [1971b] also examined male subjects in 
isolated villages in Turkey and Yucatan. Again, these subjects 
demonstrated stage development; while the United Stated, Taiwanese, 
and Mexican subjects [Kohlberg, 1969b] indicated a clear preference 
for, and use of, stage 3 and 4 reasoning (over the preconventional 
stages 1 and 2), the Turkish and Yucatanian subjects were using
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approximately half preconventional (stage 1 and 2) and half con­
ventional (stage 3 and 4) reasoning, with no stage 5 or 6 reasoning 
exhibited. Kohlberg and Turiel concluded that, in less-developed 
countries, moral stage development would be slower than in more- 
developed countries; and secondly, that stage-development would 
plateau sooner in these less-developed countries. Kohlberg 
concludes:
. . . . While the stages of development and the order of
development are universal, the rate and endpoint of 
development is not. The cross-cultural studies suggest that 
the last two stages or moral thought [stages 5 and 6] do not 
develop clearly in preliterate village or tribal com­
munities. They also indicate that [the] rate of development 
varies as a function of complexity of culture [Kohlberg, 
1971a, p. 348).
Kohlberg and Bar-Yam [1971] also interviewed 45 Israeli boys
aged 15-16. Their stage development was similar to American boys in
Kohlberg' s studies:
. . . . The middle-class city groups are essentially the
same, except that preconventional [Stage 2] thinking is 
completely absent in the Israeli middle-class boys, and 
there is a little less Stage 5 thinking. Compared to other 
boys of this age, both Israeli and American boys are some­
what advanced. They are advanced not only as compared to 
middle-class boys from "underdeveloped areas" like Turkey 
and Yucatan, but also as compared to middle-class boys from 
Great Britain [Hendry, 1971] and from Taiwan [Turiel, 
Kohlberg and Edwards, 1971]. For reasons which I believe 
are not too provincial or ethnocentric, I attribute this 
advance to the greater sense of participation of adolescents 
in a democratic national society in both the U.S. and 
Israel. Both societies are high in "role-taking oppor­
tunities" which we propose as central to the stimulation of 
moral development [Kohlberg, 1971b, pp. 349-350].
In a footnote to the above passage, Kohlberg points out
several American-Israeli differences:
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There are, of course, important differences between the 
U.S. and Israel. The U.S. is a large society with a high 
awareness of value conflicts. Israel is a small consensus 
society, but one which is non-traditional and open. The 
greater consensus orientation of Israel as well as its sense 
of national threat and need for national unity is perhaps 
reflected in the vary high concentration of middle-class 
judgment at Stage 4, Rules and Society Maintaining orienta­
tion. But both societies are high in adolescent sense of 
socio-moral or socio-political decision making and par­
ticipation [Kohlberg, 1971b, p. 350].
Additional recent studies in other cultures support 
Kohlberg's cross-cultural universality. White [1975] interviewed 
both male and female Bahamian school children aged 7-14. White's 
age-stage development trends support Kohlberg's cross-culturality, 
as does Edwards' [1975] study of Kenyans. However, Edwards' study 
is more complex; in addition to interviewing 52 University of 
Nairobi students, Edwards also interviewed 61 adolescent and adult 
"community moral leaders." Edwards determined that moral stage of 
these Kenyan subjects was not related to sex or ethnic background, 
but was related to education and occupation lending support to 
Kohlberg's contention that "Cultural teaching and experience can 
speed up or slow down development . . ." [Kohlberg and Gilligan,
1971b, p. 1058]. Edwards found that stages 4 and above were found 
only in some university students and those few community leaders who 
either had attended secondary schools or universities, or who 
occupied white collar business or professional jobs in the modern 
sector of the Kenyan economy. Edwards concludes, much as Kohlberg 
does, that stages of moral judgment should be viewed as adaptive 
structures adapted by people to accomplish culturally important
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social-cognitive tasks; consequently, moral development should, and 
would, be affected by cultural frames of references.
The preceding cross-sectional, longitudinal, and cross- 
cultural studies lend strong empirical support to Kohlberg's two 
major tenets; first, that there exists a stage-sequential, cog­
nitive-developmental structure of moral development that is 
invariant (that is, one must pass through a preceding stage to 
attain the next higher stage). Secondly, Kohlberg argues, and 
research supports, that his cognitive-developmental model is 
universal to all people and cultures. While Kohlberg’s theory has 
not been proven unequivocably (only time and substantial additional 
research can accomplish that), no major findings have refuted 
Kohlberg's two tenets. Further, other researchers have used 
Kohlberg's theory to examine corollary issues involving moral 
judgment. The two additional areas of research interest are: 
first, how religious beliefs affect moral judgment, and secondly, 
how moral judgment affects moral action.
Corollary Research
Kohlberg and Turiel [1971c], while recognizing that cultural 
"frames of reference" will affect the speed and endpoint of moral 
development, do not believe that religious beliefs influence moral 
judgment, but rather than moral judgment develops independently of 
religious belief:
We also have found that the sequence [of stages] is not 
dependent upon holding the beliefs of a particular religion, 
or upon holding any religious beliefs at all. No sig­
nificant differences appear in the development of moral
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thinking among Catholics, Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, 
Moslems, and atheists . . . .  [p. 438].
Annis' [1976] study of 71 subjects on the Allport-Vernon- 
Lindzey Study of Values questionnaire, a scriptural literalism 
scale, and a "lady in distress" dilemma indicated no significant 
correlation between helping behavior and the Study of Values 
questionnaire and literal scriptural belief, church attendance, or 
frequency of prayer. Annis concludes that moral behavior develops 
independently of religious belief systems, supporting Kohlberg's 
contention.
Finally, several recent studies were undertaken to compare 
moral judgment and development with "moral action" actually taken by 
various subjects. Among these studies are several that deal 
directly with what Brown and Herrnstein call "the paradox of 
behavior" by examining juvenile delinquents' moral judgment versus 
their behavior. Brown and Berrnstein [1975, p. 289] state this 
paradox as follows:
There is a chapter about a paradox. Students of the 
development of moral reasoning in children and young people 
have found that a great majority attains a conventional "law 
and order" morality, which involves obeying the laws and 
trying to treat people decently. In the same research 
period, students of social psychology have outdone one 
another in discovering that in certain circumstances 
respectable young people are capable of deceitful con­
formity, vandalism, and indifference to life-and-death 
problems of strangers who ask for help, are capable even of 
endangering the lives of others. For the most part, the 
subjects in the developmental studies and in the social 
psychological studies were drawn from the same population-- 
American young people, especially college students. Therein 
lies the paradox.
The two kinds of psychologists— developmental and 
social--seldom read each other's work, and since their
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studies are described in different courses, the paradox has 
largely gone unnoticed. But if a young person believes in 
being lawful and decent, how can he sometimes lie, destroy 
property, ignore a threatened stranger, and be willing to 
endanger another's life?
Actually, there is no paradox unless you make a certain 
assumption. You must assume that the way people think about 
moral issues determines the way they act. You must believe 
there is neither paradox nor even surprise in someone 
talking on the high road and acting on the low road [Brown 
and Herrnstein, 1975, p. 289.]
The study of moral action or behavior began with the 
classical work of Hartshorne and May [1928]. They hypothesized 
that:
1. Adolescents could be bimodally divided into honest 
and dishonest groups.
2. Those adolescents who cheated in some situations 
were likely to cheat in others, and those who were 
honest in some situations would likely be honest in 
other situations.
3. Moral behavior could be predicted from the adoles­
cent's verbal statement of valuing a high standard 
of honesty.
After numerous experiments, Hartshorne and May rejected 
their hypotheses. They discovered:
1. Cheating behavior was distributed in a normal bell 
curve around a mean of moderate cheating.
2. Cheating in one situation did not correlate well to
cheating in another situation--their major finding
was that cheating behavior varied directly with the 
risk of detection (as perceived by the subjects), 
the less was the likelihood of cheating behavior 
being exhibited.
3. Finally, there was very low correlation between
expressed high standards of honesty and actual
behavior in the experimental situations.
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Erdynast [1974, p. 4] stated: "These research findings on
situation variation suggest that moral conduct is in large part the 
result of an individual decision in a specific moral conflict 
situation. This research contradicts the view of moral character as 
a consistent set of general 'good habits' or as a 'strong con­
science'." Havighurst and Taba [1949] hypothesized that "honest 
behavior" implied a strongly motivated personal internal structure 
that would prohibit stealing, lying, or cheating. If a person had 
such a personal belief system that lying and cheating were wrong, 
then that person should have particularly strong "guilt" feelings 
after committing such acts. Yet the correlation between such acts 
and subsequent "guilt" was low among their experimental subjects, as 
was the correlation between conformity to a moral rule and strength 
of stated belief, supporting much the same conclusions as did 
Hartshorne and May.
More recently, Fodor [1972] replicated certain of Hartshorne 
and May's experiments. Seventy-six 13 and 14-year old males par­
ticipated in a "ray-gun" experiment; the experimental setting 
featured both high and low "risk of detection" phrases (as perceived 
by the subjects). Supporting previous research, the degree of 
cheating was significantly higher in the low "risk of detection" 
phase than in the high risk phase. These subjects were then admin­
istered Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview and the Cornell Parent 
Behavior Description. Fodor's research findings indicated that 
cheating behavior had no relation to either the subjects' level of 
moral judgment or the subjects' perceptions of parental behavior.
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Essentially, Fodor concluded, as did both Hartshorne and May, that 
cheating behavior increases as the risk of detection decreases.
Hudgins and Prentice [1973] and Prentice and Jurkovic [1973] 
examined delinquent males and their mothers matched (age and I.Q.) 
with non-delinquent males and their mothers. Their findings 
indicate that the mothers, as a group, demonstrated higher moral 
judgment than their sons, and that non-delinquent sons exhibited a 
higher level of moral judgment than did the delinquent sons. 
Interestingly, the mothers of the non-delinquent sons also scored 
higher in moral judgment than did mothers of delinquent sons. These 
findings support Kohlberg's thesis of invariant sequence and 
cultural effects. A major effect was the concept of "justice" and 
"equity" in the home environment as perceived by the sons. Similar 
to both the cross-sectional and longitudinal studies, this study 
supports the concept that moral judgment will be higher among 
children whose environment allows and encourages development. 
Wright [1978] also found that moral reasoning scores differed sig­
nificantly between delinquent and non-delinquent adolescents, even 
though Wright's study dealt with sixth graders, rather than junior 
and senior high students.
Kohlberg and Turiel [197Xd] address the differences between 
moral judgment and moral action. Regarding cheating, Krebs and 
Brown found that approximately 75% of post-conventional and con­
ventional children (stage 4 or less) cheated, while only 20% of 
post-conventional children (stages 4/5 and higher) cheated in a 
particular experimental situation [p. 458]. According to Kohlberg
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and Turiel, the later moral judgment of an adolescent who cheats
cannot be predicted, but one can predict a high level of moral
judgment for an adolescent who regularly does not cheat:
. . . .  It is only the highest, or postconventional range of 
development, that we can expect a relation between moral 
judgment and cheating behavior, since at this level the 
child can formulate a good reason for not cheating. To
refrain from cheating when neither the authority nor the 
group care demands an element of principle. As con­
ceptualized at the principled level, the critical issues of 
justics involved in cheating are: (1) the recognition of
the element of contract and agreement implicit in the 
situation, (2) the recognition that while it does not seem
so bad if one person cheats, what holds for all must hold
for one, and (3) the recognition that in cheating, one is 
taking advantage (inequity) over those who do not cheat
[Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971e, p. 458].
Kohlberg and Turiel note that the reverse seems to hold true 
regarding delinquency:
. Delinquency is a sign of low or preconventional 
moral judgment, but nondelinquency is not a sign of having 
reached the conventional level. (Many preconventional 
adolescents avoid delinquency out of fear, expediency, lack 
of opportunity, and similar reasons.) In addition to being 
preconventional in moral level, the repetitive adolescent 
delinquent is not only likely to come from a delinquency- 
prone neighborhood but is likely to come from a family with 
severe problems (Kohlberg, LaCrosse, & Ricks). In other 
words, delinquency requires sociological and psychological 
factors beyond immature moral judgment for its under­
standing, although it does indicate immature moral 
development [Kohlberg and Turiel, 1971f, p. 460].
The relationships between moral judgment and moral action 
have been examined by Kohlberg and Candee [1979]. Kohlberg and 
Candee contend that "From our viewpoint one's stage of moral 
reasoning is a filter through which these situational forces are 
perceived, interpreted, and acted upon" [p. 25]. They comment on 
the impact of "ego controls" on moral behavior [p. 26] and note that
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the existence of contractual relationship seem to elicit a higher
percentage of "morally just" actions. They postulate three types of
forces influencing moral action in general (and cheating in
particular):
Type 1 - External Social Situational Forces
Included are social punishment and reward, group 
pressures and expectations, influence of models, as 
these influence behavior through direct variation in the 
situation.
Type 2 - Internal Moral Judgment Forces
The primary variable here is moral stage. Such struc­
tures organize and interpret one's perception of the 
moral world.
Type 3- Internal Dispositions of Ego Strength or Ego Control 
The dispositions are not specifically moral; they also 
influence task performance and decisions in "non-moral" 
or "non-social" tasks, e.g. , cognitive and achievement 
performances. Included are: I.Q., attention, delay of 
gratification, time, perspective, achievement motiva­
tion, etc.
The latter two types of forces are both cognitive and 
developmental. Both increase monotonically with chrono­
logical age and with cognitive maturity throughout childhood 
and adolescence. These factors may be loosely conceived as 
adaptive abilities which are general across situations 
[Kohlberg and Candee, 1979, p. 31].
Kohlberg and Candee conclude that, for lower stage
individuals, differences between moral judgment and moral action
tend to result from environmental and peer-group pressures (i.e.,
"what most people do," "what most people expect," or "everyone does
it"). These peer-group pressures can produce quite different moral
actions than the knowledge of an individual's moral judgment would
suggest. Further, Kohlberg and Candee observe that, in day-to-day
life, the consequences of ignoring real (versus imaginary) rules and
obligations can be painful to the individual who does not observe or 
follow "society's rules."
Kohlberg and Candee also conclude that higher stage (in 
moral judgment) individuals are less prone to cheating, and tend to 
exhibit actions that are more congruent with their moral beliefs, 
than are lower stage individuals. Also, because of internal (ego- 
control) and external (peer-group pressures) differences, some 
individuals may not be able to carry out (the action element) a 
certain moral judgment (the position or "belief" element).
Summary of Related Moral Development and 
Accounting Literature
It appears that two major criticisms emerge from this recent 
literature: first, that auditing standards and accounting prin­
ciples are less than perfect for communicating financial information 
to users resulting in public clamor for regulations to provide 
legally for "full and fair disclosure." Second, the decline (or 
lack) of ethical and moral principles of the profession and its 
members, or, as Sale asserts, the lack of an "overriding 
philosophy:"
There seems little doubt that society is expecting more 
of the auditor than he has given in the past . . . .  I 
realize that if students of today continue to be trained as 
I was, they will never be able to venture into deep water. 
Present educational requirements with the emphasis on 
practical experience will never take them out of the 
shallows. The accent is presently on mechanics, not 
concepts; on rules, not philosophy; on accounting records, 
not people, on how, rather than why . . . [the accountant's] 
slow development as a profession stems partly from the lack 
of an overriding philosophy, partly because little attempt 
is made to develop and enforce generally accepted auditing
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standards and partly because little thought is given to 
exploring and redefining his reporting function in tune with 
changing needs and expectations [p. 83].
Nor is the accounting profession alone in facing public 
scrutiny; the legal, medical, and teaching professions have also 
been subjected to this public scrutiny. According to Gest [1981], 
the most recent 12 month period for which facts were available 
indicate almost 32,000 complaints were filed against attorneys with 
lawyer-discipline agencies and that Chief Justice Warren Burger 
stated in 1977 that up to half of U.S. trial attorneys are "unfit to 
appear in court" [p. 38]. The three charges against attorneys, 
according to Gest, are dishonesty, incompetence, and financial 
greed.
A growing number of lawyers are accused of defrauding 
clients, representing conflicting interests, breaking 
securities laws or other misdeeds that show either 
ignorance of ethics or contempt for them [emphasis added; 
p. 38].
Barzun [1978] has commented on private practice versus 
public need of the professions. Chronicling the public attacks on 
doctors, attorneys, teachers, and scientists, he observes:
Latest on the carpet, the austere, unfathomable account­
ant is being shown up as a master of misrepresentation, a 
cordon bleu at cooking the books. With this fall, the idea 
of "the professional man" is near to being swallowed up in 
contempt [p. 61].
Charging that ". . . the professions exhibit their fatal
tendency toward routine. Routine relieves the mind of the effort of 
thought, and it is protected by the secret and the monopoly of the 
act" [p. 65], Barzun also contends that much public confusion and 
dissatisfaction comes at a time when society
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. . . wants a huge supply of first-class services evenly
distributed . . . .  there is little chance that the 
requisite number of able and devoted professionals can be 
found. Here again we must stop and think what a profession 
as institution is for. It is to turn people who are not 
born teachers, born builders, born advocates, or born 
healers into a good imitation of the real thing.
. As a whole, every profession is always horribly 
average, mediocre. By definition it cannot be anything 
else. But the public expectation aims much higher than 
mediocrity, so that in a time of reckoning, when the laity 
is hot about its rights, general dismay and recrimination 
are inevitable [double emphasis added; p. 65].
Barzun also charges that governmental regulations results 
because ". . . a  democratic nation, bent on equality in all things, 
is sure to judge a profession by its worst exemplars" [p. 67] and 
suggests that governmental intervention is the result of the 
professions not regulating themselves. Observing that: "Through
their own routines, regulatory agencies lag behind the facts. They 
also protect featherbedding, prevent innovation, and give inspectors 
a power that may invite and spread corruption" [p. 67], Barzun 
suggests that the only hope for the professions is a moral force or 
moral code.
The message for the professions today is that their hope 
of survival with anything like their present freedoms is the 
recovery of mental and moral force . . . Moral here does not 
mean merely honest; it refers to the nature of any encounter 
between two human beings . . .  as soon as a person serves 
another, ethical issues spring to life and get settled well 
or badly . . .
A code [of professional ethics] only sets the limits 
beyond which behavior will be condemned, and the moral level 
is not high when all or most of those who live under it 
always act within a hairline of those limits. Codes, in 
fact, are for criminals and competitors, not for professions 
that want to be known as dedicated . . .
I
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Policing [i.e., governmental regulation], being nega­
tive, is not enough. It will not effect moral regeneration, 
which can come about only when the members of a group feel 
once more confident that ethical behavior is desirable, 
widely practiced, approved, and admired. After a marked 
decline, it can only be a slow growth and only one force can 
start it on its way, the force of moral and intellectual 
leadership . . . [p. 68].
Returning again to Dunstan's [1978] call for the business 
and the professional man to " . . .  engage in moral reasoning" 
[p. 76], his contention that "Moral leadership will be by persuasion 
in relation to the moral principles or axioms believed in . . ." 
[p. 78], suggests that a measurement of moral development of pro­
fessionals and businessmen would be the first research thrust for 
developing a viable moral standard to be employed by the professions 
and by business. The profession's knowledge of the measure of moral 
development of professionals and businessmen could also result in 
knowledge of how to increase or enhance personal moral judgments 
that necessarily form the internal structure of any moral or ethical 
code of conduct.
Kohlberg and Candee have contended that the higher the moral 
judgment of an individual, the greater is the likelihood of higher 
level moral action. By extension, it would appear that if the 
accounting profession could demonstrate a high level of moral 
development (e.g., stage 5 or higher, which are the post-con­
ventional levels), societal needs and expectations of accountants 
would be satisfied. This is the "moral regeneration" that Barzun 
[1978] refers to; this higher moral development is necessary for
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professions that wish to present themselves as dedicated and in the 
public service.
This chapter has presented a review of the accounting 
literature that addresses the broad spectrum of morality and ethics 
in the modern-day accounting profession. Additionally, this chapter 
has reviewed Kohlberg's cognitive-developmental theory of moral 
judgment, along with results from many researchers that support 
Kohlberg's basic contentions of "invariant stage sequencing" and 
"cross-cultural universality." Finally, a review of recent 
literature involving corollary works was presented.
The significance of this literature review for the ac­
counting profession lies in the public sector's faith and confidence 
in the auditor. Kohlberg and Candee have stated that the higher the 
level of moral judgment possessed by an individual, the greater is 
the likelihood of congruent moral action. At this time, it appears 
that the public sector and regulatory agencies are concerned that 
the accounting profession exhibit moral actions relative to many of 
the moral and ethical problems the profession faces.
Consequently, chapters 3 and 4 will present the findings of 
this study to determine the level of moral judgment evidenced by 
auditors employed by three of the "Big-Eight" accounting firms in 
the United States. From these findings, certain tenative conclu­
sions relative to the level of moral development of auditors 
examined in this study will be presented in chapter 5, as well as 
implications of this study for the accounting profession.
CHAPTER III
DESCRIPTION OF RESEARCH DESIGN AND PROCEDURE
Research in the area of cognitive and moral development 
indicates that the higher the level of moral judgment possessed by 
an individual, the greater is the likelihood of congruent moral 
action. Since the public accounting profession enjoys a high level 
of public trust, this study was undertaken to measure the moral 
development of accountants in the public accounting profession. As 
the level of moral development increases, the more likely is higher 
level moral action. If accountants exhibit high levels of moral 
development, then two implications exist: first, the public
interest will be served; second, there would be little or no 
necessity for governmental intervention and regulation of the 
accounting profession. These implications will be discussed at 
length in Chapter 5.
Because of the number of member accountants in the public 
accounting profession and the criticisms of the "accounting estab­
lishment" by various governmental agencies and critics, the scope of 
this study has been limited to accountants employed in the audit 
function of the "Big-Eight" accounting firms. To quantify the level 
of moral judgment displayed by these auditors, Kohlberg's Moral 




Investigation of Research Areas and 
Statement of Research Hypothesis
This study was designed to investigate four research areas. 
These four areas are:
1. Whether auditors have developed to Stage 5 in moral 
judgment as measured by the KMJI.
2. Whether a difference in moral judgment exists between
partners and entry-level auditors.
3. Whether a difference in moral judgment exists between
different accounting firms.
4. Whether a difference in moral judgment exists between
the two different cities, New York, New York, and New
Orleans, Louisiana.
Hypothesis 1
Kohlberg's level 5 (the post-conventional level) was used 
for stating the following research hypotheses since level 5 is the 
stated or implicit morality of the United States Constitution. He 
states:
Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation,
generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to 
be defined in terms of general individual rights and 
standards which have been critically examined and agreed 
upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of 
the relativism of personal values and opinions and a cor­
responding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching 
consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and demo­
cratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of personal 
"values" and "opinions." The result is an emphasis upon the 
"legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon the pos­
sibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations 
of social utility (rather than freezing it in terms of Stage 
4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, free agreement 
and contract is the binding element of obligation. This is
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the "official" morality of the American government and 
constitution [Kohlberg, 1977a, p. 190].
Kohlberg's postconventional levels (levels 5 and 6) indicate 
a clear effort to define moral values and principles that are 
universal to all people and in all circumstances. Thus, societal 
needs are best served with postconventional development. Conse­
quently, a profession exhibiting a high level of moral development 
would indicate a high level of responsibility for, and responsive­
ness to, societal needs and concerns. If the accounting profession 
operates at level 5, the strong implication exists that governmental 
regulation would not increase, but rather decrease, the societal 
good.
If a profession has not developed to level 5, it would
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operate at Kohlberg’s conventional level (levels 3 and 4). Reason­
ing at the conventional level is characterized as maintaining the 
status quo. There is not only a conformity to the social order, but 
also a loyalty to it and an active role in maintaining, supporting, 
and justifying this social order. Hence, such a profession may be
resistant to change; this resistance to change may also lead to
governmental intervention and regulation.
The first hypothesis is stated for measuring accountants 
moral development relative to Kohlberg’s level 5. This hypothesis 
is stated as:
Hn : The level of moral development of accountants >
Kohlberg's level 5.
H. : The level of moral development of accountants <
Kohlberg's level 5.
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 :
These three research areas involve comparisons between 
partners and juniors, between firms, and between geographical loca­
tion. The comparison between partners and juniors (hypothesis 2, 
below) is important since, intuitively, partners should exhibit a 
higher level of moral development than juniors, due in part to age, 
and in part to a greater exposure to "life crises," such as parent­
hood, death of family members and friends, and employment pressures. 
If partners do not exhibit a higher level of moral development than 
juniors, the implication then exists that the moral development of 
accountants sampled tends to plateau in early adulthood. Kohlberg's 
research [Kohlberg, 1977b] tends to support this early adulthood 
plateau.
The last two hypotheses were postulated to gain information 
regarding firm and city comparisons heretofore unknown. No a priori 
or intuitive assumptions were made regarding whether such dif­
ferences would, or would not, exist. However, the absence of any 
differences between firms and between cities would lend strength to 
the argument that cultural or working environments would have 
little, if any, influence on the attained level of moral development 
of accountants. This argument of cross-cultural universality is a 
major postulate of Kohlberg's theory. These last three hypotheses 
are stated formally as:
H£ Hq : The level of moral development of partners =
the level of moral development of juniors.
The level of moral development of partners ^ 
the level of moral development of juniors.
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H^: The level of moral development of AF^ = AF2 = AF^
H^: The level of moral development of AI\ t AF^, for some
i, j = 1, 2, 3, i ^ ji and where AF denotes a selected 
accounting firm. — .
Hq: The level of moral development of Aj^ - Ajjq
H^: The level of moral development of A ^  f Ajjq where A^y
denotes public accountants interviewed in New York and 
Ajjq accountants interviewed in New Orleans.
This chapter will describe the research areas and hypoth­
eses, the characteristics of accountants in the firm surveyed, how 
the respondents were selected for interviews, and the demographic 
characteristics of these respondents. Additionally, a description 
of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview is furnished (the complete 
Moral Judgment Interview is presented in Appendix A) along with 
examples of replies obtained from respondents.
Sample Selection
The auditors selected for this study came from three "Big- 
Eight" accounting firms in the United States. The three selected 
firms that agreed to participate in this study will be designated as 
1, 2, and 3.
For purposes of this study, individuals were selected on 
the basis of employment as either entry-level auditors (juniors) or
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audit partners of their firm. Juniors and partners were randomly 
selected from each firm in each city to comprise this study's 
sample. The following definitions and terms will be used for 
purposes of this research study.
1. Accountants-Individuals currently employed in public 
accounting (in the audit function) as either an audit partner of a 
firm (see further definitions) or as a junior staff auditor 
(jyniors) of a firm. This definition is inclusive only in the above 
framework (subject to following definitions) and specifically 
excludes:
a. accountants in public practice not employed by a 
defined firm
b. accountants employed by industry and government
c. accounting academicians
2. Audit partners-Individuals holding an equity interest in 
their respective firms and considered to be general partners in the 
legal sense. Since the AICPA provides for professional corpora­
tions, the above definition includes stockholders of such corpora­
tions as general partners and each general partner shall be a 
Certified Public Accountant. This definition specifically excludes 
principals of subject firms who do not possess the designation of 
Certified Public Accountant.
3. Juniors-(Entry-level accountants) Individuals employed 
by a subject firm in the audit function, with these particular 
characteristics:
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a. less than three years work experience with a public 
accounting firm at the time of random selection as 
a respondent in this study, and
b. initial date of employment with a public accounting
firm within two years of college graduation.
The above characteristics (a and b) are stipulated so the 
sample respondents will conform to the concept of an "entry-level"
or "beginning staff" accountant as these terms are commonly used in
the profession. Other than the definitions and terms above, no 
other stipulations or characteristics such as race, religion, sex, 
age, etc. are made or contemplated.
Each firm furnished a list of audit juniors and audit 
partners as of July 1, 1980. Six juniors and three partners were 
randomly selected from each firm in each city for a total of 54 
respondents. This sample was arrayed as illustrated in Table 3.
TABLE 3 
COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE
New York New Orleans
Totals Partners Junior Partners______Junior
Firm 1 18 3 6 3 6
Firm 2 18 3 6 3 6
Firm 3 18 3 _6 3 _6
54 9 18 9 18
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Sample Characteristics
The sample of 54 respondents yielded the following demo­
graphic characteristics of sex, age, education, years of experience, 
and other characteristics of interest.
A. Sex of Respondents
Of 54 respondents, 10 were female and 44 were male. All 10 
females were juniors at the time of this study and were almost
equally divided among firms and cities.
According to the various firms' personnel partners, this
sample of females to total juniors (10 of 36, or 28.8%) corresponds
closely with the percentage of female juniors hired by "Big-Eight" 
firms during the 1979 and 1980 recruiting years. The three
participant firms indicated that 32-36% of newly-hired juniors were 
female.
B. Accounting Experience of Respondents
All juniors surveyed in this study had less than three years
of experience in public accounting. Partners ranged from 12 to 36
years of experience at the time of this study. This distribution of
partners experience appears in Table 5.
C. Marital Status of Respondents
Of the 36 juniors sampled, 20 were single, 14 were married, 




NUMBER OF FEMALES IN SAMPLE 
(By Firm and Location)
Number of Females
 by Firm  New York New Orleans Total
Firm 1 1 2 3
Firm 2 2 2 4
Firm 3 2 1 _3
Totals 5 5 10
TABLE 5
PARTNERS' YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN ACCOUNTING
Partners' Years
of Experience New York New Orleans Total
Less than 15 years 3 3 6
15-25 years 5 4 9
More than 25 years 1 2 3
Totals 9 9 18
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Partners were parents of 1 to 5 children; the mean number of 
children per partner was 2.7. Among the juniors sampled, only two 
men were fathers (1 child each).
D. Age of Respondents
Ages of the respondents range from 21 to 60 at the time of 
this study. Juniors range from 21 to 32; the youngest partner 
interviewed was 35 and the oldest was 60. Age groupings, by junior 
and partner, follows in Table 6.
E. Education of Respondents
While each respondent had a B.S. or the equivalent, 14 had 
an M.S. or M.B.A. degree as their highest degree. Of the 14 pos­
sessing advanced degrees, 9 were juniors (25%) and 5 were partners 
(28%). Ten of 14 advanced degree holders were in the New York 
firms; more New York partners (4) had advanced degrees than did New 
Orleans partners (1). All 5 partners with advanced degrees were 
comparatively young; none were over 45 years old.
Significantly more New York respondents graduated from 
private colleges or universities than did New Orleans respondents. 
Of the 27 New York respondents, 22 (81.5%) graduated from a private 
institution; in New Orleans, only 4 of 27 (14.8%) graduated from 
private institutions.
Administration of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview
Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview was administered to 54 
respondents, equally divided between New York City and New Orleans,
TABLE 6
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COMPOSITION OF SAMPLE - BY AGE
Juniors New York New Orleans Total
Less than 25 years 9 11 20
25-30 years 9 6 15
More than 30 years O i l
Totals 18 18 36
Mean Age 24.4 years 24.2 years
Partners 















Louisiana, during the Summer and Fall of 1980. Each respondent was 
personally interviewed by this researcher in a private office 
furnished by each firm. Each interview was tape recorded; during 
the Winter of 1980 and the Spring of 1981, these interviews were 
transcribed and scored using Kohlberg's Standard Form Scoring Manual 
- 1979 [Colby, et al, 1979], hereafter referred as as the S.M.
Scoring reliability in many Kohlbergian studies has been
achieved by "blind" rescoring of the original interviews by other 
members of the research team. However, when there is only one 
researcher, this "blind" rescoring technique can introduce a "learn­
ing" bias, particularly when the sample is relatively small. After 
communication with researchers at Harvard University's Center for 
Moral Development an "independent" scoring procedure for rescoring 
approximately 25% of the original interviews was recommended. This 
independent "scoring" would avoid any researcher bias, as well as 
provide scoring verification by experienced Kohlbergian researchers.
Consequently, after all original interviews were scored, a 
random sample of 13 interviews (13 of 54 equals 24%) was forwarded 
to the Center for Moral Development for rescoring by Dr. Dan Candee. 
This rescoring indicated a high degree of scoring consistency
between this researcher and Candee, as illustrated in Table 7 (the 
Moral Maturity Score-MMS-was used rather than stage scores to
facilitate statistical operations).
The 1979 Scoring Manual indicates that agreement between 
scores is considered 100% if the MMS scores are within 1/6 of a 
stage score; on the MMS scale, this would be + 17 points. On an
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TABLE 7
CONSISTENCY OF ORIGINAL SCORING VERSUS 
RESCORING BY HARVARD UNIVERSITY'S 

































Mean Score 381 371 -10
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aggregate basis, the entire rescore sample was within this 1/6 of a 
stage score. On an individual basis, 9 of the 13 interviews were 
within + 17 points. Of the remaining four interviews, three were 
within approximately 1/4 of a stage (i.e., + 25 points). Only 1 
interview of 13 deviated more than 1/4 of a stage score; this 
deviation was less than 1/2 of a stage (-43 MMS points). In 
summary, the scoring reliability of the sample rescored by Harvard 
University's Center for Moral Development exceeded 92% based on + 
1/4 of a stage score (12 of 13 were within + 25 points).
Description of Kohlberg's Moral 
Judgment Interview
The moral judgment and reasoning used by each respondent was 
assessed by administration of Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview 
(see Appendix A). Each respondent was asked to analyze three moral 
dilemmas that were read to them individually and then determine what 
should be done. Each respondent was asked, through probing 
questions, the reasons for his answers to determine his level of 
moral judgment.
Each interview was scored by first identifying which of the 
six issues was of the prime importance in the response a respondent 
gave to either an initial or probing question. The six issues 
incorporated into Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview ( MJI) are 
divided into three dilemmas or hypothetical moral problems. The 
three dilemmas that constitute the MJI are:
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Dilemma I - In this first Heinz dilemma, the conflict is
between saving a life and obeying the law.
Dilemma II - In the second Heinz dilemma, the conflict is
between conscience and punishment.
Dilemma III - The third dilemma deals with the conflict
between contractual agreement and authority.
[Kohlberg et al] defined for each hypothetical dilemma a 
central value conflict between two moral issues. The probe 
questions for the dilemma focus on the two conflicting 
issues, e.g., in Dilemma I (the first Heinz dilemma) the 
importance of saving a life conflicts with the importance of 
obeying the law. (Life and law are the two issues for 
Dilemma I.) Each . . . Standard Form Moral Judgment Inter­
view focuses on the same issues and the interview receives a 
summary stage score for each of the six issues. The assign­
ment of a stage score for each of six content areas 
represents an attempt to sample the subject's reasoning 
across a range of content and to standardize that sampling 
across subjects.
Operationally, the issue designation of a response is 
defined by the dilemma choice which it supports or the value 
which it upholds. For example, arguments in favor of Heinz 
stealing the drug in Dilemma I provide life issue material; 
arguments against stealing the drug provide law issue 
material. [1979 Scoring Manual, p. 2-3].
During the interview scoring process, each dilemma was
studied to determine the respondent's issues of prime importance;
secondly, stage scores were developed; finally, the stage scores
were converted to the MMS (moral maturity scores). The MMS relates
to the stage (or level) scores on the basis of 100 points per stage.
For example, a stage (or level) 4 response would be represented by a
MMS score of 400, and a transitional stage 4/5 would be represented
by a MMS score of 450.
Often, mixed responses occur; these mixed responses are pre­
dominately at one stage, but indicate some adjacent stage reasoning. 
For example, a predominately stage 4 response (the major stage) with 
a 25% stage 5 response (the minor stage) would have a stage score of 
4(5) and a MMS score of 425.
An example of the conversion process follows to illustrate 
the conversion of stage scores to the MMS:
Dilemma I Stage 3 MMS = 300
Dilemma II Stage 3/4 MMS = 350
Dilemma III Stage 4 MMS = 400
1050
Consequently, the interview MMS score would be 350 (1050 4 3).
An example of an interview consisting of mixed stages may 
appear as:
Dilemma I Stage 4(3) MMS = 375
Dilemma II Stage 4(5) MMS = 425
Dilemma III Stage 3(4) MMS = 325
1125
In the second example, the interview MMS would be 375 (1125 4 3).
Response Examples
The first dilemma in the MJI involves the conflict between 
the value of life (the life issue) and the importance of obeying the
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law (the law issue). This dilemma is stated as follows (see
Appendix A for Dilemmas II and III):
In Europe, a woman was near the death from a special kind of 
cancer. There was one drug that the doctors thought might 
save her. It was a form of radium that a druggist in the
same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive
to make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the 
drug cost him to make. He paid $200 for the radium and
charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. The sick
woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow 
the money, but he could only get together about $1,000,
which is half of what it cost. He told the druggist that
his wife was dying, and asked him to sell it cheaper or let 
him pay later. But the druggist said, "No, I discovered the 
drug and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz gets
desperate and considers breaking into the man's store to
steal the drug for his wife.
The first question asked of each respondent was: "Should
Heinz steal the drug?" Because of the nature of the dilemma, each 
respondent chooses either the life issue or the law issue as the 
more important issue to him (or her). The stage or level of moral 
judgment is determined by scoring the reasoning level of each 
respondent, not the respondent's selection of the life issue or the 
law issue. Essentially, each issue (life or law) may be scored at 
one of Kohlberg's six moral stages. His definition of moral stages 
follows [Kohlberg, 1977a, p. 189-190]:
KOHLBERG'S DEFINITION OF MORAL STAGES
I. PRECONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level, the child is responsive to cultural rules 
and labels of good and bad, right or wrong, but interprets 
these labels either in terms of the physical or the hedonis­
tic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of 
favors) or in terms of the physical power of those who 
enunciate the rules and labels. The level is divided into 
the following two stages:
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Stage 1: The punishment-and obedience orientation. The 
physical consequences of action determine its goodness or 
badness, regardless of the human meaning or value of these 
consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning 
deference to power are valued in their own right, not in 
terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported by 
punishment and authority (the latter being Stage 4).
Stage 2: The instrumental-relativist orientation.
Right action consists of that which instruroentally satisfies 
one’s own needs and occasionally the needs of others. Human
relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. 
Elements of fairness, or reciprocity, and of equal sharing 
are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, 
pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a matter of "you scratch my 
back and I'll scratch yours," not of loyalty, gratitude, or 
justice.
II. CONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At this level, maintaining the expectations of the 
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of
conformity to personal expectations and social order, but of 
loyalty to it, of activity maintaining, supporting, and 
justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or 
group involved in it. At this level, there are the follow­
ing two stages:
Stage 3: The interpersonal concordance or "good b o y -
nice girl" orientation. Good behavior is that which pleases 
or helps others and it approved by them. There is much 
conformity to stereotypical images of what is majority or 
"natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judged by 
intention— "he means well" becomes important for the first 
time. One earns approval by being "nice."
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation. There iJ
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the main­
tenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of 
doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and main­
taining the given social order for its own sake.
III. POSTCONVENTIONAL, AUTONOMOUS, OR PRINCIPLED LEVEL
At this level, there is a clear effort to define moral 
values and principles that have validity and application 
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding 
these principles and apart from the individual's own identi­
fication with these groups. This level also has two stages:
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Stage 5: The social-contract, legalistic orientation,
generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to 
be defined in terms of general individual rights and 
standards which have been critically examined and agreed 
upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of 
the relativism of personal values and opinions and a cor­
responding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching 
consensus. Aside from what is constitutionaly and 
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of 
personal "values" and "opinion." The result is an emphasis 
upon the "legal point of view," but with an emphasis upon 
the possibility of changing law in terms of rational con­
siderations of social utility (rather than freezing it in 
terms of Stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal realm, 
free agreement and contract is the binding element of 
obligation. This is the "official" morality of the 
American government and constitution.
Stage 6: The universal-ethical-principle orientation.
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord 
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These 
principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the 
categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral rules 
like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal 
principles of justice, of the reciprocity and equality of 
human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human beings 
as individual persons.
STAGE 1 RESPONSES
Kohlberg's first stage, the Punishment and Obedience Ori­
entation, is characterized by the avoidance of punishment. Right 
and wrong derive not merely from the consequences of actions but 
rather from rules, which are assumed to be arbitrary and fixed. 
Consequently, stage one individuals often state that it is wrong to 
break the rules (or the laws against stealing).
The S.M. gives the following stage-one examples to the 
question should Heinz steal the drug:
1. "No, it's not right. It's a crime to steal." [S.M., p.
90]
2. "No, he shouldn't steal the drug because it's wrong." 
[S.M., p. 90]
3. "No, he shouldn't steal because he'll get caught and he 
would be called a crook." [S.M., p. 91]
Stage one individuals can also exhibit a deference to power, 
bigness, and importance of stronger people. There would be no idea 
of the moral value of life outside its physical existence, and 
powerful positions are not seen as an attainment of more respons­
ibility but rather rising above responsibility. At stage one, a 
confusion exists between the intrinsic value of a person's life and 
his or her external status characteristics. A typical stage-one 
response to the same question (should Heinz steal the drug) would 
be:
"Yes, I think he would in a case like that because his wife 
might be an important person." [S.M., p. 8]
When asked if the punishment for stealing should be more if
the lady was an important person, a stage-one reply was:
"If someone important is in a plane and is allergic to 
heights and the stewardess won't give him medicine because 
she's only got enough for one and she's got a sick one, a 
friend, in back, they’d probably put the stewardess in a 
lady's jail because she didn't help the important one." 
[S.M., p. 8-9]
STAGE 2 RESPONSES
As a person matures in his reasoning and cognitive abili­
ties, his orientation develops into the Instrument-Relativist 
Orientation. This is the stage 2 concern of hedonistic satisfac­
tion. Rather than evaluate rules and laws as absolutes to be obeyed 
to avoid punishment or gain material rewards, the stage 2 individual
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evaluates the rules and laws in light of the consequences to him. 
At stage 2, rules are flexible, and perhaps reversible in terms of
the consequences of obeying (or disobeying) them. Fairness and
reciprocity are interpreted in a pragmatic way; "You scratch my
back and I'll scratch yours." Retribution is seen at stage 2 as a
quid pro quid exchange between two individuals.
Examples of stage 2 reasoning include:
"Yes. He should steal the drug because the druggist was 
ripping him off. So why shouldn't he rip the druggist off, 
if he can save his wife." [S.M., p. 12]
"Yes, because his wife is dying. And if my wife was dying
I'd steal the drug." [S.M., p. 14]
Stage 2 individuals can also display a concern for the 
concrete property rights of ownership using law as the prime issue. 
When asked if Heinz should' steal the drug, a stage 2 individual
replied:
"No, because if the druggist was going to sell it, it was up 
to him [the druggist], because he discovered it. He dis­
covered it and it was up to him what he wanted to do with 
it." [S.M., p. 93]
Also evident at stage 2 is the concern with "bad" con­
sequences of stealing, particularly "going to jail":
(Heinz should not steal the drug) "Because if he steals the 
drug, he might get caught and then he'd have to put it back, 
and he'd be in jail . . [S.M., p. 95]
STAGE 3 RESPONSES
The first of Kohlberg's "Conventional Levels," the stage 3 
Interpersonal Concordance, or "Good Boy-Nice Girl" Orientation, is 
extremely concerned with social acceptability. Good behavior is
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that which pleases or helps others and is approved by others. 
Conformity to peer group ideals and actions is critical; moral 
values and principles that are apart, or different, from the group 
values cannot be conceived of by stage 3 individuals.
Stage 3 responses often include a stereotyped image of what
is "normal’1 or "natural" behavior. For example, a "loving" concern
for a wife could be generalized to all human beings:
(Should Heinz steal the drug? Yes) "From the point of view 
of the law, it was wrong to steal the drug. Looking at it 
from the human viewpoint, however, the druggist was in the 
wrong. After all, we all are human beings and should be 
willing to help each other out in times of despair and dis­
tress ." [S.M., p. 21]
Another example was:
". . . All of human life is precious and must be saved some 
way. I'd take it (the drug) anyway." [S.M., p. 21]
Answering the question of should Heinz steal the drug for a
stranger, one subject replied:
"It's not important whether the sick one is his wife or not, 
but that it's a person. He should do the same thing." 
[S.M., p. 21]
Another subject at stage 3 views the deviant act of stealing
as excusable in this case as a form of retribution against the
druggist's selfishness:
"Yes, I think that Heinz should steal the drug. If the 
druggist was so materialistic as to charge $2,000 for a 
small dose of the drug he deserves the robbery of his store.
I do not think that I can pity the druggist if he was so 
inhuman as to refuse to let a man pay later for a drug which 
his dying wife needed." [S.M., p. 25]
Another example of this stage 3 reasoning was given by an 
accountant in this research sample:
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"He would have to go and steal the drug. To protect his own 
family. Any family person would do anything he could to 
protect his family in any situation. This is a hurt that is 
being inflicted upon a loved one. If it was not cancer, if 
it was someone beating up his wife, he would stop him and 
maybe kill that person. That would also be an illegal act, 
but I think he is faced with a killer or the killer being 
cancer, no holds can be barred." [NY, Firm 2, Respondent 9]
Another accountant used stage 3 reasoning:
"I might be tempted to break in there myself, in that cir­
cumstance, just because I'm married and have a wife and if 
she was dying I think that that might be something that I 
would get desperate enough about to do that." [NO, Firm 2, 
Respondent 7]
STAGE 3/4 RESPONSES
As individuals mature in their moral and cognitive 
reasoning, a number will achieve Kohlberg's second conventional 
stage, the stage 4 Law and Order Orientation. However, many 
individuals will mature to a conventional reasoning that is higher 
than stage 3, but does not completely represent stage 4. Kohlberg 
refers to this level as the "mixed" conventional stage (stage 3/4). 
This stage 3/4 is not the only "mixed" stage Kohlberg identifies; a 
"mixed" stage exists between any two adjacent stages, such as 2/3 
and 4/5. Characteristics of the 3/4 mixed stage can include:
1. The stage 3 concern of caring for life but not as fully 
developed as the stage 4 concept of the value of life being 
implicitly sacred to society. In many cases, this stage also 
includes the feeling of repugnance that the druggist will "sac­
rifice" life for money. For example,
"Because it is a matter of life and death; if it gets down 
to a matter of life and death, then you are balancing the 
financial greed of one person against a life. I could see
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how a person could flounder with the dilemma, (but) even 
with a stranger one could say, my God, the life of even a 
stranger is much more important than this guy's greed." 
[S.M.., p. 40]
Another example comes from a sample respondent:
(Yes, Heinz should steal the drug) "Because I think the 
druggist is being unreasonable. He is being inhuman in 
thinking solely of profit and not thinking about a human 
life which I don't think you can do . [NO, Firm 2,
Respondent 6]
2. While the explicit reference to sacredness of life as a
societal idea (stage 4) is missing, the statements that "only God
has the right to end a life" is beyond the stage 3 idea of a
religious rule. For example:
". . . in a sense this guy (druggist) is exercising a
control over life and death which is a power that really 
should not be granted to human beings, particularly in the 
way he's exercising it." [S.M., p. 42]
Also:
"If he is just making $1500 profit, he isn't morally justi­
fied. Because that in effect sets a price on human life.
It sets him up as sort of a demi-god." [S.M., p. 42]
3. The concept that the druggist is taking unfair 
advantage of society; this concept is beyond the narrower view 
of the selfishness of the druggist, and yet had not completely 
integrated the concept of the extended social good. When asked 
if the druggist should charge so much, one of Kohlberg's sub­
jects answered:
"No, I don't think so. I just don't think that it's right.
It’s one of those 'get rich quick' attitudes, I guess 
. . . .  it just seems like if he was a druggist to begin 
with, at one time he was for the betterment of people, you 
know, to save lives and stuff like that. He has to be close
to a doctor in his thinking, I would think. I think he is 
taking advantage of his position." [S.M., p. 44]
An accountant felt that Heinz should steal the drug because
". . . when someone, especially a druggist who is not
supposed to be out there to make money, invents a drug that 
could be very beneficial to save people, to help them over 
whatever illness that they may have, especially if they are 
terminal, then precludes someone who really needs it from 
getting it by charging some exorbitant fee . . .  I don't 
believe the drug itself is worth that much money . . . This 
man (Heinz) can't afford it but he should still be able to 
have access to it." [NO, Firm 3, Respondent 7]
4. Another characteristic is the dilemma between one
set of societal expectations (saving his wife) versus another
set (obeying the law). The "mixed" 3/4 stage falls short of
stage 4 because of the "individual," rather than societal,
orientation to these societal expectations. For example:
"To (Heinz), it was probably right (to steal). He loved his 
wife, he's do to any extreme . . . Speaking in his behalf
I'd say it was right." [S.M.., p. 50]
Also:
"Yes, I think that Heinz would be, quote 'wrong' because it 
is against the law to steal. But I think that if he loves 
his wife he can rationalize it." [S.M., p. 51]
As one accountant stated:
"Yes, because I think he has a deep love for his wife . . . 
and I feel that he should do anything that doesn't really 
physically harm another person and, under these circum­
stances, I think he would be justified morally in doing so." 
[NO, Firm 3, Respondent 8]
Another accountant stated:
"Yes, to save his wife would be acting out of some emotion.
He sees something that is very dear to him. He could very
easily steal the drug. The motivation for doing that is the 
love of his wife." [NY, Firm 2, Respondent 3]
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STAGE 4 RESPONSES
In stage 3, rules and laws are seen as stereotypes of
socially desirable actions. However, at Kohlberg's stage 4 (the Law
and Order Orientation), rules and laws are seen as essential to the
maintenance of social order and necessary to prevent social
collapse. In stage 4, the rules and laws are seen as binding for
all humans. It was seen that at stage 3 antisocial behavior could
be excused (by the individual actor) if it were performed to
maintain positive social relationships; at stage 4, the basic
concern is "what if everyone did it." Further, personal relations
and obligations are viewed as duties and a necessary component of
the social order. Typical stage 4 responses often indicate that
human life rights transcend property rights or society's need for
laws or that laws, made by man, may not always be equitable in given
situations. For example:
". . . most laws that are passed are very general and when
applied to specific situations like this one, or even ones 
which can't be anticipated, arise and I think that's one of 
the reasons why, even though a law may seem fair when 
passed or moral when passed, in a particular situation which 
wasn't anticipated, then moral dilemmas arise." [S.M.., p.
67]
As an accountant stated:
"Heinz has that dilemma of living in a society that frowns 
on stealing, but I would take it back to even a more basic, 
broader basis of Mankind and start setting values at that 
point and trying to live within the confines of the law of 
the society that you are in. When he is faced with the 
choice of saving a human life and breaking the laws of the 
society of which he is in, I would break the law to save the 
life." [NY, Firm 2, Respondent 7]
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A stage 4 response can also refer to saving human life as
the highest expression of law or that saving human life is derived
from fundamental religious laws that societal laws can add to, but
not supplant. For example:
"What he (Heinz) did was legally wrong, but as I see it, 
what he did overruled anything that might have been legally 
not proper, such as stealing the drug." [ S.M. ■, p. 69]
Also,
"Legally, it wasn't right, but morally it was. After all, 
saving a life is much more important than the action he 
took." [S.M.., p. 69]
Another accountant stated:
"I'm justifying stealing it because of the thought of life 
being sacred. I'm not justifying the stealing as good. But 
I am saying, because you are saving a life. Life is more 
sacred than are property rights." [NY, Firm 1, Respondent 
4]
Also:
"Because I think that life, someone living, is more 
important than even the law . . ." [NO, Firm 3, Respondent
3]
STAGE 5 RESPONSES
Kohlberg's highest level (his Postconventional or Principled 
Level) includes stages 5 and 6. Stage 5 is the Social-Contract, 
Legalistic Orientation and differs from the stage 4 law and order 
orientation by recognizing that rules and laws can be changed by 
rational consideration of social utility. Stage 5, consequently, 
does not exhibit the "rigidity" of the law and order orientation of 
stage 4; rather than "laws creating society" as in stage 4, the 
"society creates laws" in stage 5. Essentially, societal dissent
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provides the avenue for changes in rules and laws. Important at 
stage 5 is the concept of "social contract" between individuals and 
society to promote order. However, it is also important to note 
that there will be some laws and arrangements to which reasonable 
individuals could not be expected to commit; rather, some basic 
human rights and minimum guarantees must exist in social contracts 
in order for the participants to consider the commitment worthwhile.
The following statements typify stage 5 reasoning:
"Heinz is working from a hierarchy of values, in which life 
(at least the life of his wife) is higher than honesty 
(although he tried that route too— a lower but real value—  
until it proved incapable of serving a higher imperative).
From my point of view, as distinct from Heinz's, human life 
and its preservation— at least as presented here— must take 
precedence over other values, like Heinz's desire to be 
honest and law abiding, or the druggist's love of money and 
his rights. All values stem from the ultimate value of 
life." [S.M.., p. 80]
Also:
"[The] law serves Mankind and helps keep order, but where 
does that law of society come from? It comes from the basic 
value of life . . . law is made to preserve life. There­
fore, in this case, law is not preserving life but a lesser 
right, and should be broken." [S.M. , p. 81]
Several respondents in this study offered stage 5 responses
to this dilemma:
"Laws are made to help us, to make us civilized people and 
to get along with one another. That is the purpose of laws. 
[But] the law is not appropriate if it is taking the life 
away from another person . . . .  That was not the intent 
when the people set the law . . . [Heinz should steal the 
drug] because he does not have the intent of stealing for 
his own gain. He is stealing to save a life, something 
which is very precious that can never be regained once 
it’s lost." [NY, Firm 1, Respondent 4]
Another accountant responded:
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"It came to the point of saying the law is wrong. The 
reality overcomes the law. Laws are made by men and can be 
mistaken in their application, and you have to judge for 
yourself 99% of the time. There are certain situations 
where you would break the law because it was morally wrong 
. . . You shouldn't be able to take the law into your own 
hands just because you don't agree. You break it because 
you think it is morally correct to break it." [NY, Firm 1, 
Respondent 8]
Also:
"To a certain extent laws can be arbitrary. Laws reflect a 
concensus of opinion of the mass or the group, but I would 
take it back to basic laws. It might be my philosophical 
upbringing from a Jesuit education, but when you set down 
the initial laws of Mankind, I can't see what law takes 
precedence over a human being's life." [NY, Firm 2, 
Respondent 7]
Also:
"I think in situations like this sometimes there is a higher 
law and I think that is what he is following. That is why I 
say it is illegal but not immoral. He is following a higher 
law of responsibility to help another human being to the 
best of his ability . . . The moral law in this case trans­
cends the legal law." [NO, Firm 1, Respondent 6]
STAGE 6 RESPONSES
Kohlberg's final stage is the stage of Universal-Ethical- 
Principles. The principles of justice, equality of human rights, 
and respect for the dignity of human rights are paramount at stage 
6. The principle of "treat everyone as an end, not as a means" is 
the guiding philosophical force; obligations are defined in terms of 
universal ethical principles of justice; these universal principles 
form the socio/legal system from which our law are derived. An 
example of stage 6 reasoning in response to whether Heinz should 
steal the drug:
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"It is wrong legally but right morally. Systems of law are 
valid only insofar as they reflect the sort of moral law all 
rational humans can accept. The existence of an implicit 
social contract and the violation of the conditions of the 
contract is always something that must be considered. If 
one goes this far, one must consider the personal justice 
involved, which is the root of the social contract. The 
ground on which society should be created is individual 
justice, the right of every person to an equal consideration 
of his claims in every situation, not just those which can 
be codified in law. Personal justice means, 'treat each 
person as an end, not a means."1 [ S.M., Part 1, p. 27]
Mo stage 6 responses were encountered during this research 
with accountants; only a small number of accountant responses were 
scored at the Postconventional or Principled bevel, and those that 
were scored at the Principled level were predominately stage 4/5, 
with only one clear stage 5 score (on dilemma only) found. There 
was no respondent that clearly responded at stage 5 over all three 
dilemmas.
Summary
This chapter has described the research methodology utilized 
in this research study. Particular attention was given to various 
demographic characteristics of the sample, as well as the sample 
selection process itself.
Given the importance of Kohlberg's 1979 Scoring Manual to 
this research, numerous examples of responses typical of the various 
stage scores were presented from the 1979 Scoring Manual to illus­
trate the six stages of moral judgment. Additionally, a number of 
responses from this research sample provided further examples of 
stage scoring.
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The following chapter (Analysis of the Data) will present 
results of the hypotheses testing using the data collected from 54 
sample respondents. Since this study employed a "nested" design 
(that is, partner/junior differences are nested within each firm, 
and firm differences are nested within each city), both the para­
metric nested-design ANOVA and a non-parametric rank-transformed 
nested-design ANOVA will be employed for hypotheses testing at the 
.05 level of significance.
In addition to the use of the "nested" design ANOVA for 
hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, hypothesis one will be tested using the
non-parametric sign test first suggested by Arbuthnott [Daniel, 
1978, p. 27ff].
CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
This chapter will present an analysis of the data collected 
from 54 randomly selected employees of three "Big-Eight" accounting 
firms. Table 8 presents the distribution of Moral Maturity Scores 
(MMS) as well as age, sex, and employment status of the sample 
respondents by firm and city.
The four hypotheses stated in Chapter 3 were tested at the 
.05 level of significance; each hypothesis and the related statis­
tical tests are presented below.
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis was stated as:
H„: The level of moral development of accountants >
Kohlberg's level 5.
H.: The level of moral development of accountants <
Kohlberg's level 5.
This hypothesis was stated to determine whether auditors
have developed to Kohlberg's level 5 as measured by the KMJI.
Hypothesis 1 was tested by using Arbuthnott's one-sample sign test.
The assumptions of Arbuthnott's sign test are:
A. The sample available for analysis is a random sample 
from a population with [an] unknown median M.
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F denotes female; blank denotes male
2...Highest attained degree; blank denotes Bachelor's degree
*denotes partner
Ill
C. The variable of interest is continuous. The n sample 
values are designated by X 1, X_, X [Daniel, 1978,
p. 27]. 1 2 n
The 54 responses obtained in this study represent a random sample of
Big-Eight partners and juniors in New Orleans and New York City.
The responses were measured on an ordinal scale and were continuous.
Arbuthnott's sign test converts the data being analyzed to a
series of plus or minus signs. If the null hypothesis (the level of
moral development of accountants > Kohlberg's level 5) is true, then
approximately one-half or more of the observed MMS should be > 500.
If a sufficiently large number of observed MMS are less than 500,
the null hypothesis must be rejected.
An examination of Table 8 indicates that all 54 respondents
display MMScores of less than 500 (Kohlberg's level 5). Hence, the
number of negative signs equal 54, and positive signs equal zero.
By using Arbuthnott's one-sample sign test, the number of positive
signs (K) equal zero, and n=54, and solving for z at the .05 level
of significance, hypothesis 1 is rejected (that is, the level of
moral development of accountants in New Orleans and New York City is
not equal to Kohlberg's level 5), since the probability of observing
a value of z of -7.21 is less than 0.00003 at the .05 level of
significance (Siegel, 1956, Table A, p. 247).
(K + .5) - .5n (0 + .5) - .5(54)
z =   =  = -7.21
.5 >/ n .5 V 54
By extension, a sub-hypothesis that the level of moral 
development > Kohlberg's level 4 (MMScore of 400) was tested:
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K = number of positive signs = 7 
n = number of positive and negative signs = 50
(K + .5) - .5n (7 + .5) - .5(50)
z = ----------------  =   = -4.95
.5 / n - .5 / T O
This sub-hypothesis is also rejected; the probability of observing a 
value of z of -4.95 is less than 0.00003 at the .05 level of sig­
nificance (Siegel, 1956, Table A, p. 247).
As illustrated in Table 9, the median MMS score of partners 
is between 373 and 375; for juniors, the median MMS score is between
368 and 370. The combined median for both partners and juniors is
373. Table 10 illustrates the firm, city, and overall MMS score 
means; the overall mean for the entire sample is 374.5. Both the 
median and mean measures strongly support the rejection of 
hypothesis 1.
Implications of Hypothesis 1
The rejection of hypothesis 1 implies that accountants in 
this study have not developed to Kohlberg's postconventional level 
(stages 5 and 6). As stated earlier in chapter 3, the postcon­
ventional level of moral development would indicate a clear effort 
to define moral values and principles that would be universal to all 
people in all circumstances. Accordingly, societal needs and the 
public interest are best served with postconventional development. 
A profession exhibiting a high level of moral development would 
indicate a high level of responsibility for, and responsiveness to,
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370 354 P 345 P
373 357 P 354
373 Median 357 354
375 360 354
377 360 P 355
381 363 357 P
383 364 357
393 365 P 360
407 367 360 P
419 368 360 P
427 368 363 P








































MMS SCORES AND MEANS OBTAINED IN THIS STUDY
New York City New Orleans
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 3
Jrs. Partners Jrs. Partners Jrs. Partners Jrs. Partners Jrs. Partners Jrs. Partners
354 429 400 419 363 360 368 370 357 373 400 373
368 381 343 375 340 354 277 383 377 337 392 377
410 393 380 427 373 345 400 407 400 355 392 370
377 386 373 435 368 415
360 370 367 340 390 357
377 343 360 364 354 365
Status
Means 374.3 401.0 370..3 407.0 362.,6 353.0 364..0 386.6 374.3 355.0 386,,83 373
Firm Means 383 .2 382 .5 359 .4 371 .5 367 .8 382.3
City Means 375. 074 373.925
Overall Mean 374.5
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societal needs and the public interest. Additionally, if the 
accounting profession operated at stage 5, the strong implication 
would exist that government regulation would decrease, rather than 
increase, the societal good.
The results of this hypothesis indicate that sampled 
accountants have not developed to Kohlberg's stage 5, but rather 
exhibit stage 4, and lower, development. To the extent this sample 
is representative of the accounting profession, the conclusion of 
stage 4 and lower moral development (the conventional levels) is 
that the accounting profession should perhaps take appropriate 
action to assure higher level moral development as a condition to 
public practice. If no action is taken, then moral development in 
the accounting profession will likely plateau at stage 4. Since 
stage 4 is characterized as a conformity with, and loyalty to, the 
social order, as well as actively maintaining and justifying this 
social order, it is possible that the accounting profession might be 
resistant to change. More importantly, this resistance to change 
could possibly lead to more governmental intervention and 
regulation.
This concern with societal change responsiveness and govern­
mental regulation of the accounting profession has not gone 
unnoticed by the AICPA leadership. In October, 1982, outgoing A1CPA 
chairman George D. Anderson stated: "We, as a profession, must
. . . be able to demonstrate [that] the services we perform are of a 
meaningful nature to our clients and are in the public interest" 
[ The CPA Letter, October 25, 1982, p. 1, emphasis added]. If the
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profession heeds Hr. Anderson's admonition, then increasing the 
moral development of the accounting profession is a logical step in 
the right direction.
Hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 
The second, third, and fourth hypotheses were stated as: 
H2: H^: The level of moral development of partners =
the level of moral development of juniors.
H^: The level of moral development of partners f
the level of moral development of juniors.
H^: Hq : The level of moral development of AF^ = AF£ = AF^
H^: The level of moral development of AF^ f AFj, for
some i, j = 1, 2, 3, i ^ j ,  and where AF denotes 
a selected accounting firm.
H^: H^: The level of moral development of A ^  = A^q
H^: The level of moral development of A ^  f A^q
where Aj^ denotes accountants interviewed in New 
York and A^q  accountants interviewed in New 
Orleans.
The structure of this study suggests the use of a nested 
design in which the factor status (partner or junior) is nested
w'ithin firm (1, 2, or 3), which is itself nested within city (New
York or New Orleans). The linear model for such a design is
where
Y. .. . = Li + c. + f ., + s.,..-. + e. , .ljkl . M 1 j(i) k(ij) l(ijk)
Y..., denotes the MMS for individual 1 with status k in liklJ firm j in city 1
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p denotes the average MMS for all individuals in the 
population
denotes the city effect, i = 1, 2
f.,., denotes the firm effect, j = 1 ,  2, 3 ju)
Sk(ij) ^enotes t*ie status effect, k = 1, 2,
e, denotes the unexplained random variation,
-LUJKJ 1 = 1 2 ,  . . . n. .,ljk
It is assumed that the e's are independent, identically distributed 
2n(0,o ) random variables. Of course, this assumption implies that 
the Y's themselves are independent, identically distributed normal 
random variables as well.
To determine whether or not the assumption of normality is 
valid for the data of this study, skewness (a^) and kurtosis 
(peakedness) (a^) were calculated. Skewness (a^) = -.349618 (slight 
negative skewness) and kurtosis (Of̂ ) = 5.28091. Since kurtosis is 3 
for the normal distribution, it appears that the parent distribution 
for these observations has heavier tails and hence differs sig­
nificantly from the normal. Heavier tails indicate a greater 
probability of occurrence in the extreme tail ends of this distribu­
tion than would exist in the normal distribution.
This hypothesis of normality was further tested using a 
modification of the Kolmogorov goodness-of-fit test. The 
assumptions of the Kolmogorov goodness-of-fit test are that "The 
data consist of the independent observations X^, X^, •••> X^, con­
stituting a random sample of size n from some unknown distribution 
function" [Daniel, 1978, p. 268]. Since use of the Kolmogorov test
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is permissible only when both the mean and variance of the dis­
tribution function are known, the modification presented by 
Lilliefors was employed [Conover, 1980, p. 357ff]. Lilliefor's 
modification tests the hypothesis of normality without specifying 
the mean or variance of the normal distribution; the Kolmogorov 
goodness-of-fit test assumptions of independent observations and a 
random sample still exist. The obtained p-value of .092 indicates a 
possible trend away from normality.
As an exploratory device for examining the differences among 
the levels of the factors in this study, the overall means for each 
level of each factor were calculated. These are given in Table 11 
below. No strongly significant differences are readily apparent 
among the Factor Means in Table 11.
TABLE 11 








N.O. 27 373.9 1 18 377.4 Junior 36 372.1






An examination of the data in Table 10 indicates that one 
of the individuals in the data set had a MMS score of 277. This 
value is 3.6 standard deviations from the overall mean of the scores
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and therefore deserves consideration as a possible outlier (defec­
tive datum). Therefore, the skewness and kurtosis were recalculated 
after deleting this observation and quite different results were 
obtained: Of̂  = .607675 (positive skewness) and = 2.947674
(almost the same as the normal distribution). The Lilliefors test 
for normality yielded quite different results as well: with the
apparent outlier deleted, the calculated value of the test statistic 
had an approximate p-value of .023, indicating a significant 
departure from normality. The factor means were also strongly 
affected, as indicated in Table 12 below.
TABLE 12









N.O. 26 377.7 1 17 383.3 Junior 35 374.8






Due to the presence of an apparent outlying observation and 
the rejection of the hypothesis of normality for the data once this 
observation was removed, it was decided to consider a nonparametric 
alternative to the usual analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures for
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a nested design. No nonparametric equivalent exists for analyzing a
nested design; however, Conover suggests:
"The recommended procedure in experimental designs for which 
no nonparametric test exists is to use the usual analysis of 
variance on the data and then to use the same procedure on 
the rank transformed data. If the two procedures give 
nearly identical results the assumptions underlying the 
usual analysis of variance are likely to be reasonable and 
the regular parametric analysis valid. When the two pro­
cedures give substantially different results, the analysis 
on ranks is probably more accurate than the analysis on the 
data and should be preferred." [Conover, 1982, p. 337].
Therefore, it was decided to perform the usual ANOVA for nested
designs on the original data and then apply it to the ranks of these
observations, after they had been ordered from smallest to largest.
The ANOVA table for the analysis of the MMS scores is given 
in Table 13 below. Note that no significant differences among the 
levels of any of the factors were detected by this analysis.
As per Conover's suggestion, the rank transformed data were 
analyzed using the same procedures. The ANOVA table for this rank 
transformed analysis is given in Table 14 below. Based on this rank 
transformed analysis, there appears to be a marginally significant 
difference among the accounting firms (p~.052).
As can be seen from these analyses, different results were 
obtained when the rank transform was used. This could be due to any 
one of several factors, including (1) the slight negative skewness 
in the original data, (2) the apparent deviation from normality 
(p~.09) or (3) the presence of an apparent outlier. In an attempt 
to ascertain the effect of (3), both analyses were performed again, 
after deleting this outlier (the MMS of 277). The results for these
TABLE 13 
ANOVA FOR MMS VALUES
Sub of Mean F- P-
Source DF Squares Square Value Value
Model 11 10770.0 979.09 1.45 .19
City 1 17.80 17.80 .03 .87
Fira (City) 4 4314.59 1078.65 1.60 .19
Status (City Fira) 6 6437.61 1072.94 1.59 .17
Error 42 28269.5 673.08 — --
Total 53 39039.5
TABLE 14 
ANOVA FOR MMS RANKS
Sua of Mean F- P
Source DF Squares Square Value Value
Model 11 4341.04 394.64 1.89 .068
City 1 13.50 13.50 .06 .800
Fira (City) 4 2133.17 533.29 2.56 .052
Status (City Fira) 6 2194.38 365.73 1.76 .132
Error 42 8751.46 208.37 --
Total S3 13092.50
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53 observations are given in Table 15 and the results for the 53 
rank transformed observations are given in Table 16.
A comparison of Table 13 and 15 indicates that the deletion 
of the apparent outlier had a significant effect upon the results of 
the analysis of the original data. (Note that marginally sig­
nificant differences among firms and between partners and juniors 
are now indicated.) However, as expected, a comparison of Tables 14 
and 16 indicates that the conclusions drawn from the analysis of the 
ranks are the same whether the apparent outlier is included or 
deleted. These results reinforce Conover's opinion that the rank
transform technique is more appropriate for these data and therefore 
should be used in this study.
An examination of Table 14 and 16 indicates a (marginally) 
significant difference among the firms. In order to detect which 
differences between pairs of firms caused this difference, the least 
significant difference technique [Kirk, 1982, p. 466] was applied to 
the three possible pairwise comparisons of average MMS rank for the 
firms. No significant differences were found, so it must be con­
cluded that the significant F statistic indicates a significant 
contrast which is not a pairwise comparison [Kirk, 1982, p. 115].
The conclusion from the ANOVA for the rank transformed MMS 
data is that no significant differences exist among cities, firms, 
or juniors and partners. Even though the overall F statistic for 
firms was marginally significant (p~.052), no significant dif­
ferences between pairs of firms could be found. Consequently,
hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 cannot be rejected.
TABLE 15
ANOVA FOR MMS VALUES WITH APPARENT 
OUTLIER DELETED
Sua of Mean F- P
Source DF Squares Square Value Value
Model 11 10167.19 924.29 1.98 .057
City 1 88.15 88.15 .19
F i n  (City) 4 4616.97 1154.24 2.47
Status (City Fin) 6 5462.06 910.34 1.95
Error 41 19186.70 467.97 -- —
Total 52 29353.89
TABLE 16
ANOVA FOR MMS RANKS WITH APPARENT 
OUTLIER DELETED
Sua of Mean F- P
Source DF Squares Square Value Value
Model 11 4260.34 387.30 1.96 .060
City 1 55.04 55.04 .28 .601
Fira (City) 4 2216.63 554.16 2.80 .038
Status (City Fin) 6 1988.68 331.45 1.67 .152
Error 41 8116.66 197.97
Total 52 12377.00
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Implications of Hypothesis 2
The hypothesis of equality (between partners and juniors) 
could not be rejected using the rank transformed nested ANOVA as 
suggested by Conover. Further, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U 
test also resulted in non-rejection of the null hypothesis of 
equality (calculated T = -.5809; the two-tailed z values are ±1.96).
Intuitively, partners were expected to demonstrate a higher 
level of moral development than juniors. Partners were sig­
nificantly older (mean age of partners was approximately 44; for 
juniors, approximately 24.3), were more likely to be married and be 
parents, more likely to have had major life crises (death, 
accidents, etc.) and had more experience than did the juniors.
This equality of moral development reinforces Kohlberg's 
findings that moral development plateaus in the early 20s. Two 
possible explanations arise from the stage 3 and 4 (conventional 
level) plateau: first, the work and living environments of
individuals after completion of their formal education may not offer 
the impetus for moral development. Kohlbergian theory indicates 
that individuals prefer moral reasoning one stage higher than that 
stage they occupy. However, if most, if not all, other individuals 
one comes into contact with also exhibit the same (or lower) stage 
development, then little or no opportunity exists to observe and 
internally assimilate higher stage reasoning, and consequently, 
development cannot occur. Kohlberg also implies that higher stage 
development is more likely to be observed in very highly educated 
persons. His few recorded post-conventionally developed (stage 5
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and/or 6) were predominately either graduate students or PhDs in 
philosophy and the social sciences. These post-conventionally 
developed individuals are quite unlikely to be members of the same 
social groups or settings as accountants. Hence, the feedback 
necessary for cognitive and moral growth is unlikely to exist in the 
accountants social infrastructure.
Secondly, and somewhat analagous to the preceding explana­
tion, is that stage 3 and 4 individuals actively promote and 
encourage the status quo. This "active promotion" of the status quo 
suggests a relative lack of change responsiveness (or a rather high 
resistance to change). If an individual is "locked-into" his or her 
belief system or position in society, it becomes increasingly dif­
ficult to focus on a universal morality for all individuals without 
the existance of some external stimulus. This explanation implies 
that some "change agent" is required to move from conventional to 
post-conventional moral development. If this "change agent" does 
not exist in the individual's environment, spontaneous growth is 
unlikely to occur.
If the accounting profession determines that post-con- 
ventionally developed individuals are desirable to serve the public 
interest, then the AICPA would be a logical choice as this "change 
agent." Moral development can be encouraged; moral development 
courses can be implemented in college accounting curricula, in 
professional schools of accounting, and in professional development 
programs (both "in-house" and AICPA/state sponsored programs). No 
doubt ekists that implementing these moral development courses will
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be expensive; neither should there be much doubt that many 
accountants will resist such activity as a transgression of their 
personal or moral rights. Yet the cost, to accountants, to their 
clients, and to society, of governmental regulation and inter­
vention, can be staggering. As long as the accounting profession 
operates with a conventional morality, governmental regulation in 
some form appears inevitable. The profession must decide if the 
cost of implementing moral development opportunities is less in the 
long run than continuing governmental intervention or the erosion of 
public opinion.
Implications of Hypotheses 3 and A
The hypotheses of equality between firms (H3) and between 
cities (H4) could not be rejected using the rank transformed nested 
ANOVA as suggested by Conover. Further, even though the overall F 
statistic (p~.052) was marginally significant for firms (H3), a 
subsequent "least significant difference" technique as suggested by 
Kirk failed to discover any significant differences among the three 
possible pairings of firms.
The hypotheses of equality of moral development between 
firms and cities were stated to gain information that heretofore was 
unknown. No intuitive or a priori assumptions were made regarding 
whether equality of moral development between firms and cities 
would, or would not, exist. However, the inability to reject the 
hypotheses of equality reinforces Kohlberg's postulate of cultural 
universality. The absence of significant differences in moral
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development among firms or between cities argues that cultural or 
environmental factors have little, if any, influence on the attained 
level of moral development of accountants sampled in this study.
The Summary of Results of these four hypotheses tests are 
presented in the following section.
Summary of Results 
Four hypotheses were analyzed in this chapter using non­
parametric and parametric statistical techniques at the .05 level of 
significance. Table 17 summarizes the tests of hypotheses.
Chapter 5 will present summaries and conclusions of this 
study, as well as potential future research areas.
TABLE 17 
HYPOTHESES TESTS SUMMARY
REJECT NULL HYPOTHESIS 
AT THE .05












SUMMARY, LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Summary
Criticism of the moral behavior and conduct of business and 
professional groups has been increasing in recent years. The 
accounting profession has for decades been concerned with the public 
trust granted to it as auditors of American business. Since the 
public trust is encouraged by the technical competence and moral 
development of its practitioners, this study was concerned with 
measuring the level of moral development in the accounting 
profession.
Lawrence Kohlberg developed his Moral Judgment Interview to 
measure the attained level of moral development in individuals. 
Extensively researched by numerous scholars, Kohlberg's theory has 
been empirically tested, using his Moral Judgment Interview as the 
measurement instrument, both longitudinally and cross-sectionally, 
and is the only known instrument for measuring moral development of 
individuals. The use of Kohlberg's instrument to examine the moral 
development exhibited by auditors in public accounting appears to be 
the first time that moral development of accounting practitioners 
has been specifically measured.
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Kohlberg's instrument was individually administered to 54 
randomly selected audit partners and staff auditors (juniors) from 
three "Big-Eight" accounting firms located in New York City and New 
Orleans. Non-parametric and parametric statistics were employed to 
test the four hypotheses of this study. These hypotheses are 
described below:
Hypothesis 1: The level of moral development of auditors
was Kohlberg's level 5 or greater.
According to Kohlberg [1977a], the postconventional levels 
(5 and 6) indicate a clear effort to define moral values and 
principals universal to all people. Society is best served with 
postconventional moral development, according to Kohlberg. If the 
accounting profession has not attained level 5, then it operates at 
the conventional levels (3 and 4). Since the conventional level 
moral development is characterized as actively maintaining the 
status quo and an allegiance to it, a profession exhibiting con­
ventional development would generally be resistant to change for the 
societal good. This "resistance to change" often leads to govern­
mental intervention and regulation.
Hypothesis 2 : The level of moral development of partners
equaled the level of moral development of juniors. 
Intuitively, one would suspect that partners, by virtue of 
age, experience, and maturity, would exhibit greater moral develop­
ment than juniors. If, in fact, there exists no difference in moral 
development between the sampled partners and juniors, the implica­
tion then exists that moral development plateaus in an individual's
i
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early 20s. Kohlberg's research [1977b] tends to support this "early 
20s" plateau.
Hypothesis 3 : The level of moral development of auditors in
each firm was statistically equal.
Hypothesis 4 : The level of moral development of auditors in
each city was statistically equal.
The last two hypotheses were postulated to obtain informa­
tion regarding firm and city comparisons heretofore unknown. One of 
Kohlberg's two major tenets is that of cross-cultural universality. 
Rejection of either (or both) hypothesis 3 and 4 would cast doubts 
on this tenet of Kohlberg's theory of moral development. However, 
the absence of any differences between firms and cities would lend 
strength to the argument that cultural or working environments would 
have little, if any, influence on the attained level of moral 
development of auditors.
In this study, the first hypothesis was rejected and the 
second, third, and fourth hypotheses could not be rejected at the 
.05 level of significance. The findings of this study indicate:
1. The level of moral development exhibited by accountants 
was less than Kohlberg's stage 5; the results indicate 
that sampled accountants attained a mixed stage 4(3), 
which is a preponderance of stage 4 and approximately 
25% stage 3 reasoning.
2. There was no statistical difference in moral development 
between juniors and partners, between firms, or between 
cities.
These results also support other studies that indicate that 
moral development plateaus at stage 4 for the majority of Americans
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(Holstein [1976]; Rest, Davidson, and Robbins [1979]; Colby,
Kohlberg, and Gibbs [1979b], among others). Colby asserts:
Since moral reasoning clearly is reasoning, advanced moral 
reasoning depends upon advanced logical reasoning. A
person's logical age has been found to put a ceiling on the
moral stage she/he can attain . . . .  Logical development, 
then, is necessary for moral development and sets limits to 
it, but it is not sufficient. Most individuals are higher 
in logical stage than they are in moral stage [Colby, 
et al. , 1979a, p. 13].
Since moral development lags behind intellectual develop­
ment, the path toward moral development lies in additional 
education. If the American society feels a higher level of moral 
development is necessary for its auditors, then the mission of 
American colleges and schools of accounting and/or business should 
incorporate moral education in the 80's curricula.
The following sections of this chapter discuss limitations 
of this study and recommendations for further research in this area.
Limitations of This Study
A major limitation of this study was that no employees
between the junior staff level and partners were sampled. The two
employee levels omitted are generally referred to as seniors and
managers. The rationale for this decision to omit seniors and
managers was based on Kohlberg1s developmental stage theory. In
Kohlberg's paradigm, stage structure is universal and sequential
[Kohlberg, 1971b] and is non-regressive. Kohlberg states:
Stages are defined as differences in form or organization of 
responses, not in the content or function of the response.
Each . . . (higher) stage involves a new set of interests
and concerns and defines a new function, e,g., finding an 
identity. Each cognitive or moral stage serves the same
function, logical inference or moral judgment, but serves it
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in a new way, form or pattern of functioning [Kohlberg, 
1977b, p. 188].
For purposes of this study, employees with the greatest 
difference in age and experience would be the two groups most likely 
to demonstrate differences in moral development, if any such dif­
ference exists at all. Since the partner-junior classification of 
employees exhibited the greatest differences in age and experience, 
they served as the sample population for this study.
A second limitation of this study was the number of 
employees interviewed and number of accounting firms represented. 
Since each in-depth personal interview was expected to take (and 
actually did take) 1 1/2 to 2 hours per interview, the amount of 
time donated by these accounting firms was very substantial. 
Further, since the billing rates of partners were four to five those 
of juniors, the opportunity cost to the firms was significantly 
greater for the partners' time. Also, the possibility of future 
longitudinal studies suggested that increasing the number of juniors 
interviewed (from 18 to 36) should be attempted. Each firm agreed 
to this request. Financial limitations precluded participation of 
more than three firms in this study; if this research encompassed 
the remaining five "Big-Eight" firms, these findings may have 
differed.
The conclusions reached in this study were based on "Big- 
Eight" auditors from three firms interviewed in two cities. Since 
financial limitations precluded interviewing in other major 
metropolitan areas, the same limitations mentioned above also apply;
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consequently, location bias may exist. Since no local and/or 
regional accounting firms were interviewed, the findings of this 
study may not be applicable to non-"Big-Eight" auditors.
A further limitation exists by the use of auditors as the 
research group. Employees and partners in the tax and management 
service areas of the accounting profession were specifically 
excluded from this study. Consequently, the results of this study 
may not be applicable to tax and management service personnel.
Two final limitations exist regarding the Kohlbergian 
methodology employed in this study. First, some subjects inter­
viewed may have had prior exposure to Kohlberg's interview and/or
may be familiar with stage responses. While this prior exposure to
Kohlbergian theory is much more likely in subjects with training or
education in psychology or education, the possibility of prior 
exposure of auditors interviewed in this study cannot be ignored.
Secondly, errors in scoring the auditors' interviews could 
exist. Substantial time and money was spent for initial scoring of 
these interviews. Further, Harvard University's Center for Moral 
Development was employed to rescore approximately 25% of the 
original interviews to assure scoring reliability. Nonetheless, 
scoring errors could still exist, thereby adversely affecting the 
results of this research.
Recommendations for Further Research 
The preceding section indicates several limitations of 
this study that further research should address. It would appear
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beneficial if subsequent research was directed to all professional 
staff (juniors, seniors, managers, and partners) to ascertain if the 
level of moral development is similar among these employees. It 
also appears to be beneficial to expand the number of firms sampled 
to include all accounting firms (local and regional, as well as 
national). It is apparent that a significant expansion of this 
research to include all professional employees and all accounting 
firms would require a very significant effort; it may be appropriate 
for the AICPA or the American Accounting Association (AAA) to 
allocate financial resources for supervision of further research in 
this area. Additionally, a longitudinal study of auditors inter­
viewed in this study could be conducted to determine if changes in 
their moral development occur over time.
Significant additional work is required to determine the 
actual level of moral development required for CPAs to meet 
society's expectations and/or needs. The AICPA's Code of Ethics 
does not state a "level of moral development" that CPAs should 
possess in order to practice public accounting. Research should be 
directed toward determining if such a "level of moral development" 
should be attained by an individual entering the profession; 
further, what level of development (e.g., conventional-stage 4; 
postconventional-stage 5; or some other stage) that is desirable, 
and attainable, should be examined.
Further, if the AICPA were to state that a certain level of 
moral development of CPAs is desirable, the implications for 
regulatory agencies (such as the SEC and IRA) must be investigated.
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The implications of such a position with regard to the business 
users of CPA services must also be researched. Finally, substantial 
additional research would be required to determine the most cost- 
effective method for raising the accountants' level of moral 
development.
In addition to expanding this original research, additional 
research along the lines of this study examining other professionals 
(e.g. attorneys, physicians, engineers) and public servants (elected 
officials, Senators, Representatives, ranking federal, state, and 
local employees, among others) should prove interesting. This 
research could also be extended by measuring if differences in moral 
development exist between accounting firms that have recently 
experienced significant lawsuits (or criminal actions) brought 
against them and those firms without such recent experience.
Another fruitful area for research would lie in the develop­
ment of business and/or accounting related dilemmas for use in 
measuring moral development in a "real-world" environment. While 
Erdynast [1974] has done some preliminary work in this area, sig­
nificant additional work still remains.
Finally, the area of "values" education in the typical 
business/accounting curricula of universities has been largely 
unexplored, and should warrant additional research. It appears that 
"values" and "moral development" can be taught; Reimer [1981] states 
that both moral judgment and moral action increased in a high school 
after introduction of moral discussion programs. Candee [1980] 
prepared an "in-house" program for medical pediatric residents that
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was successful in increasing moral analytical reasoning ability (the 
ability to identify moral categories, to construct philosophical 
arguments, and to identify the steps in the moral reasoning 
process). Candee's program took place during morning rounds and 
required less than forty hours of case presentation (and no outside
time on the part of the residents). With Candee's pioneering
research applied to a work environment, the tools for extension of
"values" education to "in-house" programs and seminars have been
developed. With additional research and modification, these tools 
can be applied at the university level as well as "in-house" 
programs.
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